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Abstract
This thesis examines various aspects of environmental economics. The first chapter estimates how
individuals' beliefs about climate change are affected by local weather fluctuations. Climate change
is a one-time uncertain event with no opportunities for learning; the belief updating process may not
be fully Bayesian. Using unique survey data on beliefs about the occurrence of the effects of global
warming, I estimate how individuals use local temperature fluctuations in forming these beliefs.
I test for the presence of several well-known psychological heuristics and find strong evidence for
representativeness, some evidence for availability and no evidence for associativeness. I find that very
short-run temperature fluctuations (1 day - 2 weeks) have no effect on beliefs about the occurrence
of global warming, but that longer-run fluctuations (1 month - 1 year) are significant predictors
of beliefs. Only respondents with a conservative political ideology are affected by temperature
abnormalities.
In the second chapter, I examine the economic impacts of natural disasters by estimating the
effect of hurricanes on US counties' economies 0-10 years after landfall. Overall, I find no substantial
changes in a county's population, earnings, or the employment rate. The largest empirical effect of
a hurricane is observed in large increases in government transfer payments to individuals, such as
unemployment insurance. The estimated magnitude of the extra transfer payments is large. While
per capita disaster aid averages $356 per hurricane in current dollars, I estimate that in the eleven
years following a hurricane an affected county receives additional non-disaster government transfers
of $67 per capita per year. Private insurance-related transfers over the same time period average
only $2.4 per capita per year. The fiscal costs of natural disasters are thus much larger than the
cost of disaster aid alone. Because of the deadweight loss of taxation and moral hazard concerns,
the benefits of policies that reduce disaster vulnerability, such as climate change mitigation and
removal of insurance subsidies, are larger than previously thought. Finally, the substantial increase
in non-disaster transfers suggests that the lack of changes in other economic indicators may be in
part due to various social safety nets.
In the third chapter, I estimate the extent of adverse selection in area yield insurance. Despite
a long-run decrease in developed countries' vulnerability to weather shocks, agriculture worldwide
remains susceptible to weather fluctuations. If climate change increases the frequency and intensity
of extreme weather events, as it is predicted to do, food prices will likely become more volatile.
A well-functioning insurance market is key to keeping the agricultural sector stable. I discuss the
institutional and empirical features of the US crop insurance market. I outline the ways in which
market designers have attempted to minimize adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as the
remaining ways in which the market remains vulnerable to these. I then test for a particular form
of adverse selection: whether public information (last year's average yield in the county) that is
not explicitly priced by crop insurance companies predicts takeup of area yield insurance plans. I
find no evidence that the recent yield influences takeup. I then perform another reduced-form test,
using end-of-growing season yields as predictors of insurance takeup at the beginning of the growing
season, and find that area yield insurance takeup is higher when average yields are higher. This
suggests that the net selection into area yield plans favors providers, not buyers of insurance. In
some specifications, the total demand for crop insurance is affected by current and past yields as
well, potentially due to changes in the desirability of other plans.
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Chapter 1
How do people update? The effects of
local weather fluctuations on beliefs
about global warming
1.1 Introduction
The hypothesis that increased greenhouse gas concentrations may lead to a rise in global temper-
atures first emerged in the 1960's (Peterson et al. 2008). The overwhelming majority of climate
scientists now agree that the evidence for anthropogenic global warming is strong (Rosenberg et al.
2010).
Climate change may be one of the most disruptive events of the 21st century. Predictions about
average temperature changes and economic costs of climate change are uncertain, but generally
bleak: for increases of 5-6 *C, which is a "Business as Usual" scenario, the predicted economic loss
is 5-10% of global GDP (Stern 2007).
Despite efforts of scientists, the general public first became concerned about global warming
only in 1988, after the US experienced what back then was the hottest year on record (1987)
and an extreme drought. However, the public's attention soon waned (Ungar 1992). To date,
the international collaboration necessary to reduce warming has not been achieved. The Kyoto
protocol, an international agreement established in 1997 to curb greenhouse emissions, did not
affect several of the largest emitters today (such as the US, which has not ratified it, and China,
which is exempt from compliance). The US has recently tried and failed to pass legislation that
would have established a C02 emissions trading scheme. Although there is consensus that large cuts
in global emissions are necessary to avoid substantial harm (United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change 2010, 2011), there is currently no international agreement that is expected to
result in such cuts.
The implementation of effective public policy depends not only on climate science but on public
perception of the occurrence and seriousness of climate change. Although the potential reasons for
the lack of a strong international treaty are abundant, the lack of overwhelming public support may
be a particularly important one. In a 2010 Gallup Environmental Poll, only 50% of respondents
thought that the effects of global warming have already begun to happen, a further 20% thought
they would never happen, and only 29% thought that global warming would be a significant threat
to them or their lifestyle in their lifetime.
Global warming is a very visible issue, and thus some public consensus is necessary to implement
policies that address it. For this reason, it is important to consider how beliefs about climate change
are formed and updated. Many models with uncertainty often assume that agents update their
beliefs using Bayes' rule. In some settings, this type of rationality is difficult to justify without
empirical evidence. Climate change is a highly complex one-time event without opportunities for
learning. How individuals use information in this or similar contexts is an empirical question.1
I use a large representative sample of US adults who were surveyed about the occurrence of global
warming (the underlying cause of climate change) to test how local temperature fluctuations affect
beliefs. The dataset is rich and spans multiple years, allowing me to include numerous controls.
The question about the occurrence of global warming is straightforward and has categorical answers
that fit easily into a regression framework. I consider the effects of both short (1 day - 2 weeks)
and prolonged (1 month - 12 months) periods of abnormal temperatures.
Overall, beliefs are not affected by very short-term (on the order of days) temperature fluc-
tuations, although longer periods of extremes do have an effect. Some features of updating are
consistent with Bayesian belief formation. However, when I test for the presence of specific biases,
I find evidence that representativeness, a well-known psychological heuristic, plays an important
role in the observed updating patterns. Availability is present to the extent that individuals give
significantly more weight to local temperatures than to national or global temperatures. However,
there is no evidence for another type of availability, where individuals give more weight to recent
temperature fluctuations than to less recent ones. I find no evidence for associativeness, where
recent temperature fluctuations cause individuals to recall similar weather instances from the past
and update based on the recalled rather than the true weather history. Finally, when I estimate
the effects of weather by political ideology, I find that only those who are conservative or very
conservative are affected by temperature fluctuations.
I contribute to the existing literature on the effects of environmental cues on beliefs about global
warming by focusing on the effects of longer-run temperature abnormalities; previous studies have
only looked at temperature fluctuations over one day to one week. In addition, I test for the presence
of specific biases, based on previous psychology studies unrelated to global warming. Finally, due
to the large sample size, I am able to test for differences in updating between conservatives, liberals,
'The empirical evidence on updating is mixed. Evidence for various forms of irrational updating includes DeBondt
and Thaler (1984) in finance, Terrell (1994) and Clotfelter and Cook (1993) in lottery play, and Egan and Mullin
(2009), Risen and Critcher (2009), and Cameron (2005) in climate change beliefs.
and moderates.
Section 2 describes the conceptual framework and links different biases to expected relationships
between temperature and beliefs. Section 3 describes the data and the construction of the regression
variables. The empirical framework and results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
Let G and -,G represent the states of the world with and without global warming, respectively. Let
E be some evidence observed by someone who is a Bayesian updater. Beliefs about whether global
warming is happening or not will then be determined by Bayes' formula:
Pr (GE) = Pr (EIG) Pr (G)
Pr (EIG) Pr (G)+ Pr (E|-,G) (1 - Pr (G))
In general, "evidence" can include global or local weather, a news story on melting glaciers, an
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, or long-run climate data. For the effect
of local temperatures to be detectable empirically, people must observe them more precisely than
temperature elsewhere (otherwise any change in beliefs will be absorbed by year fixed effects).
The change in beliefs following the updating of evidence from E to E' is Pr(GIE') - Pr(GIE).
The extent to which beliefs change depends on the prior, Pr(G|E), and the relative likelihood of
the observed evidence when there is global warming, . The further this ratio is from one,
the larger the change in posteriors.
Following a period of abnormal local temperatures, a rational Bayesian updater may significantly
change his beliefs about global warming if the ratio Pr(t'IG) (where t' represents newly observedPr(t' j-,G)
temperatures) is large. For most local weather events, conditional on national weather, this ratio is
likely to be close to one. Furthermore, this effect will be detectable empirically only if respondents
observe local weather more precisely than national weather. If the updating process is largely
Bayesian, the following patterns should be observed:
1. Longer periods of abnormal temperatures will have a larger effect than shorter periods.
2. More extreme temperatures will produce larger changes in beliefs.
3. Within a relatively short period of time, such as a year, whether extreme temperatures oc-
curred more or less recently should not matter.
In addition to Bayesian updating, there are several heuristics that have been found to play a role
in belief formation: associativeness, availability, and representativeness.
Under the availability heuristic, people use salient instances of an event to judge its likelihood.
For example, someone who has witnessed a serious auto accident will judge the probability of such
an accident to be higher that someone who has not seen one, even if both have identical statistical
information (Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Kahneman et al. 1982). This bias predicts that people
may be more likely to believe that global warming is occurring if they have experienced local
fluctuations in temperatures, even if it is not rational to do so. The bias may be stronger if the
temperature fluctuations are recent because recent events are presumably more salient.
Under the associativeness heuristic, current events cause past instances of similar events to
be recalled (Mullainathan 2002). Abnormal temperatures could bias the recalled history toward
similarly extreme events, leading the individual to conclude such events are more frequent than
they are. In this case, E will be more likely to include events that are similar to recent events and
less likely to include those that are not.
Associativeness and availability are similar, but can nevertheless be distinguished by statistical
testing. If the availability heuristic is present, recent local temperature fluctuations will influence
beliefs more than less recent fluctuations. If the associativeness heuristic is present, the interaction
between recent and similar past temperature patterns will be a significant determinant of beliefs.
Representativeness is judging the probability of a sample by how much it resembles a salient
feature of the population it came from (Kahneman et al. 1973; Grether 1980). For example, people
judge the sequence HTTHTH to be more probable than the sequences HHHHTH and HHHTTT
(Kahneman et al. 1972), although all three sequences are equally likely. Importantly, the repre-
sentativeness of a sample is not affected by the sample size; therefore, neither are the subsequent
probability estimates made by individuals. If the representativeness heuristic is involved in up-
dating, then the length of the time over which temperatures are abnormal should not affect the
magnitude of the effect.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Gallup survey
For beliefs about global warming, I use Gallup's Environmental Poll for the years 2003-2010. Every
March, about 1,000 US adults are surveyed within a 3-4 day window. 2
The dependent variable in the subsequent regression analysis is the answer to the question of
when the respondent believes the effects of global warming will start to happen. The exact wording
is shown in Table 1, along with the breakdown of answers. The numerical value assigned to each
answer for regression analysis is in parentheses following the answer. 3
Overall, about 56.3% (out of 7,847) of respondents believe that the effects of global warming
have already begun to happen, 12.9% think they will never happen, and the rest think they will
2The sample is representative of the US. Respondents are surveyed by phone. Global warming is not the sole focus
of the survey: the topics include energy, the economy, US environmental policies, Arctic drilling, and environmental
behaviors.
3
"Refused" and "Don't know" are treated as missing in the regression analysis. These options never include more
than 5% of the sample; for most of the questions, less than 3% of respondents chose these options.
happen sometime in the future. In the Electronic Supplemental Materials, I also show that beliefs
about global warming vary significantly by characteristics such as gender, income, and education.
One possible objection to using the above question for assessing the effect of temperatures on
beliefs is that the answers are categorical rather than expressed as probabilities. Although this does
add some noise to the estimation, as long as there is some underlying continuous probability that
the individual uses to answer the question, the effect of weather can still be seen using qualitative
data.
To further check that any potential lack of significance is not due to noisy survey answers, I
estimate how people update their beliefs about the country's economic conditions, shown in the
Electronic Supplemental Materials. I find that respondents use local unemployment rates to make
an inference about the economic conditions in the US, which supports the notion that the survey
answers are not so noisy as to make statistical testing impossible.
Figure 1 shows the breakdown of beliefs by stated political ideology. The top graph shows the
fraction of people of each political ideology that believes the effects of global warming have already
begun to happen. The bottom shows the fraction that believes the effects of global warming will
never happen.
Both graphs reveal considerable differences between people of different ideologies. Very conser-
vative respondents are more likely to believe that the effects of global warming will never happen
(nearly 38% of respondents reported this belief) than that they have already begun to happen (30%
thought this). The probability that a respondent believes the effects of global warming have already
begun to happen is highest for those who are liberal or very liberal (73% and 76%, respectively);
these groups are also the least likely to report believing that the reports of global warming will
never happen (2.5% and 3.5%, respectively). Political ideology is in theory multifaceted and stems
from beliefs about many environmental and non-environmental issues. There is nevertheless a stark
ideological divide on an issue that should be purely a scientific question.
1.3.2 Temperature fluctuations
This section outlines how abnormal temperature fluctuations are measured. For temperature data, I
use National Climatic Data Center's daily weather station observations for maximum temperatures
for 1949-2010, matched to counties. 4 These data were provided by Michael Greenstone and are used
in Deschenes and Greenstone (2007a and 2007b).
The basic abnormality measure is the number of standard deviations from the long run average:
NumS~d -tempea - tempecdNumSDed = np (1.1)
Sdcm
d indexes the day of year; c indexes the county; m indexes the month. tempcd is the observed
maximum temperature in county c on day d. temped is the corresponding long-run average, con-
"If there are multiple weather stations in a county, I average their daily measurements.
structed by computing a seven-day running average across all years that precede the year of the
survey. In other words, for respondents in county c taking the survey in year Y:
d+3 Y-1
temped = - S1948) Y E temIpedy (1.2)
s=d-3 y=1949
sdem is the standard deviation of maximum temperatures, constructed by computing the stan-
dard deviation of observed temperatures in that month and county between 1949 and 2000. I match
each respondent's location and date of survey to the temperature data to determine the respon-
dent's temperature deviations x days ago, where x ranges from 0 (day of the survey) to 364 (one
year ago). 5
To allow for a cumulative effect of longer stretches of abnormal temperatures, I construct vari-
ables that measure the fraction of days over a given time period on which the number of standard
deviations was above a certain (high) quantile and the fraction of days on which it was below a low
quantile. The formulas for these variables are:




where 1 is an indicator function. t is now relative to the day the respondent took the survey.
n ranges from 7 to 360 days. q is a quantile of the number of standard deviations. I use q = 75,
90, and 95. Thus, the variables above measure the fraction of days on which temperature standard
deviations were at or exceeded the 75th, 90th, and 95th quantiles and the fraction of days on
which temperature standard deviations were at or below the 25th, 20th, and 5th quantiles. The
resulting FracBelowcnq variables have means and standard deviations similar to their corresponding
FracAboveeq variables.
1.4 Effect of temperatures
1.4.1 Empirical framework
In this section, I outline the procedure for testing whether local temperature fluctuations signifi-
cantly affect people's beliefs about global warming and, if so, whether this is due to psychological
heuristics. Each regression specification is an ordered probit, which assumes that there is an un-
derlying continuous outcome variable that is observed as categorical. In addition to computing the
5 The respondents are called between 5pm and 9pm local time, making the inclusion of that day's temperatures
reasonable.
average effect of an explanatory variable across all categories, it is also possible to estimate its effect
for each category.6
I first regress beliefs on the number of standard deviations of maximum temperatures on the
day of the survey:
Happeningiet = fnumSDet + Xicty + iet (1.5)
i indexes the individual; c indexes the county; and t indexes the survey date. Happeningict is
the belief about the occurrence of the effects of global warming, equal to 5 if the respondent said
they have already begun to happen, equal to 1 if the respondent said they will never happen, and
taking on intermediate values for the other answer options. 7 Xict is a set of flexible controls: sex,
race, age, age squared, indicators for education level, income category, political ideology indicators,
interactions of education and sex, interactions of political ideology and sex, and state and year fixed
effects. numSDct is the number of temperature standard deviations in the respondent's county on
the day of the survey. I also estimate the effect of the number of standard deviations the day before
the survey.
The second regression specification allows for the influence of longer periods of abnormal temper-
atures. This specification tests the predictions of the Bayesian updating model, as well as whether
representativeness plays a role.
Happeningiet = /3FracAbovecnq + Xict'y + Ciet (1.6)
FracAboveenq is the fraction of days over the n days before the survey on which the number of
temperature standard deviations in county c exceeded the qth quantile, as described in Section 3.2.
I also perform this test using the variable FracBelowcnq as the independent variable. This test also
reveals whether extremely low temperatures the opposite effect of extremely high temperatures, in
other words, whether the updating process is symmetric.
To test for associativeness, I interact the fraction of days over the past week on which tem-
peratures exceeded a particular quantile with the fraction of days over the past n days on which
temperatures exceeded the same quantile:
Happeninget = /3FracAbove7q FracAboveenq (1.7)
+OFracAbovec7 q + SFracAboveenq
+Xict'Y + Eict
The coefficient of interest is p. The idea is that even though people may not be affected by
6 See Wooldridge (2002) for details about this estimation procedure.
7The full numerical coding of the questions is shown in Table 1.
last week's temperature abnormalities directly, a subset of them may be, as it causes them to recall
similarly extreme weather over a longer period of time.8 I also perform a version of this test using
the variable FracBelowe7q and FracBelowcnq in the place of FracAbovec7q and FracAbovenq.
1.4.2 Results
Table 2 shows the marginal effects of a one standard deviation change in maximum temperatures on
(a) the day of the survey and (b) the day before the survey. The effect of temperatures is computed
for each of the five answer categories and can be interpreted as the additional probability that
the respondent will choose a particular answer category for a one-unit change in the independent
variable.
The estimated effects are small and insignificant. An effect of greater than one percentage point
per one standard deviation of maximum temperatures can be ruled out for the answer category
where the respondent believes the effects of global warming have already begun to happen.9 The
estimated effects on other answer categories are similarly small. Thus, very short-run fluctuations
do not affect beliefs about global warming. This differs from some previous studies, which find that
beliefs are affected by very short-run fluctuations (Egan and Mullin 2010; Joireman et al. 2010; Li
et al. 2011; Schuldt and Schwarz 2009).10 This divergence may be due to differences in the survey
questions used to assess beliefs.
Figures 2-4 show the estimated effects of longer periods of abnormal weather on whether the
respondent believes the effects of global warming have already begun to happen (answer value 5).11
This is a natural category to focus on, as it should be most influenced by recent weather fluctuations.
Moreover, the estimated effect of weather for this answer category generally has the opposite sign
from the other four answer categories. Finally, the marginal effects on different answer categories are
derived from a single estimated coefficient and a set of estimated thresholds and thus have nearly
identical significance levels. The coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the probability
that the respondent believes the effects of global warming have already begun to happen following
a one-unit change in the fraction of abnormal days over the given time period. 12
Figure 2 shows the estimated coefficients from regressions with the least extreme thresholds -
standard deviations that are at the 25th percentile or lower and those at the 75th percentile or higher.
The effect appears to be slightly asymmetric. Abnormalities over 7 and 14 days are insignificant.
Persistently colder-than-normal weather over 30-360 days before the survey significantly decreases
8This is not the only possible formulation for associativeness. I test two other formulations, which produce similar
results and are described in the Electronic Supplemental Materials.
9Looking at the effect of the average number of standard deviations over the week before the survey (shown in
the Electronic Supplemental Materials) produces similar results.
10In a controlled experiment, Risen and Critcher (2009) find that indoor temperatures also affect beliefs.
"Point estimates can be found in the Electronic Supplemental Materials.
'
t Because the fraction of abnormal days theoretically varies from 0 to 1 (over longer periods, the fraction never
reaches 1 in practice), this coefficient can also be interpreted as the effect of going from zero days having temperature
deviations outside the defined thresholds to all days having temperature deviations outside the thresholds.
the probability that respondents will believe that the effects of global warming have already begun to
happen, while persistently warmer-than-normal weather has the opposite (but insignificant) effect.
A one-unit increase in the fraction of days of abnormally cold weather over 60 days (as defined in
this specification) decreases the probability that the respondent believes that the effects of global
warming have already begun to happen by 11.7 percentage points, while a one-unit increase over
180 days decreases it by 22.5 percentage points.
Figure 3 shows the results using slightly more extreme thresholds - standard deviations that are
at the 10th percentile or lower and at the 90th percentile or higher. Abnormally warm weather now
has a significant effect of 15.4 percentage points and 18.6 percentage points over 30 and 60 days,
respectively. Abnormally cold weather has a significantly negative effect on beliefs over 60-180 days.
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the effects of abnormally warm and cold days are asymmetric: colder
days decrease beliefs in global warming much more than warmer days increase them. Moreover, the
magnitude of the coefficients does not increase for periods of more than 120 days. The last fact is
indicative of representativeness.
Figure 4 shows the effects of deviations that lie outside the most extreme thresholds - 5th
percentile or lower and 95th percentile or higher. Here, periods of abnormally warm weather signif-
icantly (p<0.1) increase the probability that the respondent says the effects of global warming have
begun to happen for all period lengths. Extreme negative deviations, on the other hand, now have
an insignificant effect on beliefs over the entire time period. The colder-than-normal estimates are
now smaller (in absolute value) than their warmer-than-normal counterparts.
Next, I check for differences in updating by political ideology. Specifically, I separate the sample
into conservatives, moderates, and liberals, as reported by the respondent. I estimate the effect on
beliefs of the fraction of days on which the temperature standard deviations exceeded or were below
a given threshold over periods of varying lengths for each of the groups.
Moderates and liberals are largely unaffected by this measure of abnormal weather (results are
shown in Tables A4 and A5 in the Electronic Supplemental Materials). However, conservatives'
beliefs are affected by weather fluctuations over various periods. These results are shown in Table
3. The response is asymmetric in that cooler-than-normal temperatures have no effect on beliefs,
but warmer-than-normal temperatures do.
Why the response to abnormal weather is limited to conservatives is not immediately clear.
Because conservatives are the least likely group to believe that the effects of global warming have
already begun to happen, it's possible that they have a distribution of priors that is more likely to
be affected by local weather abnormalities. In other words, weather fluctuations may make liberals'
and moderates' beliefs that the effects of global warming are already occurring stronger, but they
do not cause them to change their answer category. Alternatively, conservatives may have more
distrust toward scientific reports and media and give that information less weight, relying relatively
more on personal experience. The current data do not allow me to distinguish between these two
hypotheses. However, this is an important area for future research.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the results of the associativeness test from equation 8. The coefficients
are, for the most part, indistinguishable from zero. There is some indication that associativeness is
present for temperature deviations at or below the 25th percentile, but given the lack of robustness
with respect to other specifications, it seems more likely that the significance is spurious. This and
two other specifications of associativeness (shown in the Electronic Supplemental Materials) suggest
that this bias does not play a large role in updating in this context.
Overall, my findings resonate with Cameron (2005), who finds that updating exhibits both
Bayesian and non-Bayesian attributes. The updating process exhibits some qualitative traits con-
sistent with Bayesian updating: very short-run fluctuations for the most part do not affect beliefs
and more extreme temperature abnormalities (for the medium-run measures) produce larger changes
in beliefs. However, whether local temperature fluctuations should affect a Bayesian's belief about
global warming is not straightforward. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes that
it is scientifically difficult to attribute a single event to the occurrence of global warming (IPCC
2007).
Moreover, if people observe weather everywhere in the US with nearly equal precision, local
weather should be an insignificant predictor of beliefs, due to the inclusion of year fixed effects. The
fact that local temperature plays any role in the updating process suggests that availability is also
present, either through respondents observing local weather more precisely or giving it more weight
in the updating process than weather elsewhere. Because coefficients do not consistently increase
with the time period and because the effects of abnormally cool and abnormally hot temperatures
are asymmetric, representativeness also seems to play an important role in the updating process.
There is little evidence for another kind of availability, which would predict that more recent
temperature fluctuations have a larger effect than less recent ones. There is also little evidence of
associativeness, which would predict that those who recently experienced abnormal temperatures
and who had more abnormal weather in the less recent past would change their beliefs more than
people who only experienced one of those two events.
1.5 Conclusion
Scientific estimates suggest that global warming may have catastrophic effects on the world's climate.
The dire projections and overwhelming agreement in the scientific community that the time for
mitigation is running out make immediate policy intervention increasingly necessary. However,
international talks have to date failed to produce a comprehensive binding agreement to combat
climate change. Although the potential reasons for this are abundant, the lack of public pressure
may be an important contributing factor. It is thus essential to understand how individual beliefs
about climate change are formed and what causes them to evolve.
Global warming is a highly uncertain event whose occurrence is very difficult to determine
objectively, even for climate scientists. In addition, most people do not have all the information
that a climate scientist does. Various violations of Bayesian updating have been found empirically.
Biases such as representativeness, associativeness, and availability can cause individuals' updating
processes to deviate from Bayesian models.
In this paper, I study the updating of beliefs about global warming. Using a multi-year survey,
I test whether individuals use local temperature abnormalities to form inferences about global
warming's occurrence. I find that very short-run fluctuations in temperatures over 1-2 days prior to
the survey do not significantly affect beliefs. However, longer periods of abnormally warm or cold
temperatures do change the probability that the respondent believes the effects of global warming
have already begun to happen. This effect is limited to conservatives for reasons that are beyond
the scope of this paper. Although some features of the updating process are Bayesian (more extreme
temperature deviations produce larger changes in beliefs), the pattern of updating is also consistent
with representativeness (beyond a 120-day period, longer periods of abnormal weather do not have
a statistically larger effect).
The exact pathway through which these effects work is difficult to determine. Because I do not
observe individuals' information set, I cannot rule out that individuals observe weather everywhere
but irrationally give larger weight to local weather. It's also possible that the effects of temperatures
are indirect. For example, more extreme temperatures could lead to more discussion of global
warming in the local media and more exposure to other evidence about global warming, such as
IPCC reports. 13
Finally, the stark ideological divide in beliefs dwarfs any changes that plausible weather fluc-
tuations can cause. Conservatives are much less likely than liberals to believe that the effects of
global warming have already begun to happen and much more likely to believe that they will never
happen. The exact reasons for this divide are beyond the scope of the paper, but should be an
important subject of future research.
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1.7 Electronic Supplemental Materials for: How do people update?
The effects of local weather fluctuations on beliefs about global
warming
1.7.1 Beliefs and Respondent Characteristics
In this section, I show the results of regressing stated beliefs about climate change on respondent
demographics. The correlations between "Which of the following best reflects your view on when
the effects of global warming will begin to happen?" and respondent characteristics reveal which
groups are less likely to believe in the occurrence of climate change and support the notion that
this belief is well-formed.
The included demographics are: sex, age, age squared, white indicator, log income, log income
squared, education level indicators, political ideology indicators, and male-by-education-level and
male-by-political-ideology indicators. Because the answers are categorical, the regression specifica-
tion is an ordered probit.
The results are shown in Table 1. There is a quadratic relationship between age and beliefs
about the timing of global warming, increasing in age and decreasing in age squared. The same
pattern is true for income, implying that those with the highest and the lowest incomes are least
likely to believe that the effects of global warming have already begun to happen.
More educated people are more likely to believe that the effects of global warming have already
begun to happen, although males with college or graduate education are less likely to believe this
than females with the same education level.
By far, the largest determinant of belief differences is political ideology: conservatives are much
less likely to believe that the effects of global warming have begun to happen. Conservative males
are even less likely to believe this than females, although the opposite is true for very liberal males.
1.7.2 Beliefs About Economic Conditions and Unemployment
Another way to address the concern that the survey answers may not reflect well-formed beliefs is
to consider other beliefs that may be affected by measurable local information. Respondents to the
Gallup Environmental Poll were also asked whether the state of the overall economy is "excellent",
"good", "only fair" or "poor". Over the whole sample period, 31% of respondents said that economic
conditions are good or excellent, 45.4% said they are fair, and 22.7% rated them as poor.
I use an ordered probit regression to examine the relationship between the respondent's assess-
ment of economic conditions in the US and the average local (county) or state unemployment rate
in the past month and in the 12 months before the survey. The results are shown in Table 2. An
increase in the local or state unemployment rate over the past year has a large negative effect on the
respondent's assessment of economic conditions. All the estimates are significant, and the inclusion
of state or county fixed effects does not change the results qualitatively.
There is a smaller negative effect of last month's state and local unemployment rates on the
probability that the respondent states that economic conditions are excellent or good and they are
insignificant or marginally significant once county or state fixed effects are included. The larger
significance of the annual unemployment rate is consistent with a Bayesian updater giving more
weight to a larger number of observations. This provides evidence that people do sometimes use
local information for updating beliefs and that the categorical survey answers are not so noisy as
to make studying them empirically impossible.
1.7.3 Effect of Other Temperature Variables
In this section, I present supplementary tests of the effect of weather on beliefs about global warming.
Specifically, I look at the effect of changes in temperatures and of the average number of standard
deviations over the past week (rather than the number of standard deviations in the day of or before
the survey). The results are shown in Table 3. The change in temperatures between the day of and
the day before the survey is an insignificant predictor of beliefs. However, a one degree increase in
temperatures between the day before the survey and two days before is estimated to decrease the
probability that the respondent believes the effects of global warming have already begun to happen
by 0.14 percentage points. This is counterintuitive, unless the temperature changes highlight to the
respondent the variability of weather and cause him to discard other weather-based evidence that
was increasing his belief in the occurrence of global warming. Alternatively, the correlation may be
spurious. The average temperature standard deviation in the past week has no significant effect on
beliefs. This also holds if deviations are measured in degrees. Thus, there is little evidence that
people are systematically influenced by very recent fluctuations in weather.
1.7.4 Additional Analysis
Table 4 shows the point estimates corresponding to Figures 1, 2, and 3.
Table 5 shows the effects of longer-run abnormal temperatures on moderates' beliefs about
whether the effects of global warming have already begun to happen.
Table 6 shows the effects of longer-run abnormal temperatures on liberals' beliefs about whether
the effects of global warming have already begun to happen.
1.7.5 Other Associativeness Tests
In this section I present two alternative tests for associativeness. In the first alternative test,
I interact the indicator for whether the number of temperature standard deviations exceeded a
particular quantile on the day before the survey with the fraction of days over the past n days on
which temperatures exceeded the same quantile:
Happeningiet = 1 {numSDe,ti_ > sdq} FracAboveenq + OFracAboveenq + 61 {fnumSDc,t-1 > flj)
+Xicty + Cict
The estimated coefficients p for the change in the probability that the respondent believes the
effects of global warming have already begun to happen are shown in Figure Al. None of the
estimates is statistically significant, supporting the notion that associativeness does not play a
significant role in updating beliefs about global warming.
In the second alternative test, I interact the number of standard deviations on the day before the
survey with the fraction of days over the past n days on which temperatures exceeded a particular
quantile:
Happeningiet = /numSD,,t_1FracAboveenq + OFracAboveenq + 6numSDe,t_1 (1.9)
+Xicty + Eict
The results are shown in Figure A2. As in the previous test, there is no evidence for this
particular form of associativeness playing a role in belief formation.
Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary of responses, 2003-2010
Which of the following best reflects your view on when the effects of global warming
will begin to happen?
They have already begun to happen (5) 56.3%
They will start happening within a few years (4) 4.0%
They will start happening within your lifetime (3) 9.9%
They will not happen within your lifetime, but they will affect future
generations (2) 16.8%
They will never happen (1) 12.9%
Observations 7,847
The coding of responses into numerical values to create dummy variables is in
parentheses following the answer choice. Percentages may not add up to 100 due to
rounding, people responding "I don't know" or refusing to answer the question.
Figure 1. Beliefs by political ideology
The Effects Have Already Begun to Happen
Very conservative conservative Moderate Liberal Very iberal
The Effects Will Never Happen
Very conservative Conservative Moderate Liberal Very liberal
Table 4: Effect of recent temperature deviations on beliefs about global warming
On day of survey One day ago
Pr (Never Happen) 0.390 0.419
(0.301) (0.268)
Pr (Happen after lifetime) 0.359 0.382
(0.284) (0.247)
Pr (Happen within lifetime) 0.113 0.121
(0.086) (0.076)
Pr (Happen within few years) 0.026 0.027
(0.019) (0.017)





The regression specification is an ordered probit. Marginal effects shown. Robust standard
errors (clustered by state) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. Includes controls for respondent characteristics, state and year fixed effects.
Probability is expressed in percentage points.
Figure 2. Effect of longer-run weather abnormalities 1. The solid line represents the point
estimates. The dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval
75th percentile or above
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Figure 3. Effect of longer-run weather abnormalities 2. The solid line represents the point
estimates. The dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval
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Figure 4. Effect of longer-run weather abnormalities 3. The solid line represents the point
estimates. The dashed lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval
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state) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %. Includes
controls for respondent characteristics, state and year fixed effects. Probability is expressed
as a fraction. Marginal effects for one standard deviation change shown.
Figure 5. Associativeness test 1. The solid line represents the point estimates. The dashed lines
represent the 95 percent confidence interval
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Regression specification is an ordered probit. Robust standard errors (clustered by
state) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %.
Includes state and year fixed effects. Omitted categories are: moderate, high school
education or less, male x moderate, male x high school or less.
Table 2: Beliefs about the state of the economy and local employment conditions
Average unemployment rate over
past year Unemployment rate last month
Panel A: local unemployment rates
Pr (excellent) -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -1.48E-04
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.000)* (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.000)
Pr (good) -0.020 -0.013 -0.029 -0.017 -0.007 -0.006
(0.004)*** (0.006)** (0.014)** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.014)
Pr (fair) 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.001 -1.75E-04
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.000)
Pr (poor) 0.019 0.012 0.031 0.016 0.006 0.007
(0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.014)** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.014)
Fixed effects none state county none state county
Observations 3,066 3,059 2,102 3,066 3,059 2,102
Panel B: state unemployment rates
Pr (excellent) -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.001)**
Pr (good) -0.022 -0.031 -0.038 -0.022 -0.027 -0.036
(0.004)*** (0.012)** (0.017)** (0.004)*** (0.012)** (0.014)**
Pr (fair) 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.003
(0.001)*** (0.003)** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.003)** (0.001)**
Pr (poor) 0.021 0.029 0.037 0.021 0.025 0.035
(0.004)*** (0.010)** (0.017)** (0.004)*** (0.010)** (0.014)**
Fixed effects none state county none state county
Observations 8,132 8,132 3,066 8,132 8,132 3,066
Robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions control for age and age squared and
include the following fixed effects: year, employment status, income category, race, male,
political ideology and education. Marginal effects shown. Probability is expressed as a
fraction.
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Observations 5,431 5,429 5,468 5,468
The regression specification is an ordered probit. Marginal effects shown.
Robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses; * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Includes controls for respondent
characteristics, state and year fixed effects. Probability is in percentages.
Table 4: Point estimates for Figures 1-3
Figure 1








































































































































Note: The regression specification is an ordered probit. Robust standard errors (clustered by
state) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Includes
controls for respondent characteristics, state and year fixed effects. Probability is expressed as a
fraction. Marginal effects for one standard deviation change shown.










































































































































is an ordered probit. Robust standard errors (clustered by
state) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %. Includes
controls for respondent characteristics, state and year fixed effects. Probability is expressed as a
fraction. Marginal effects for one standard deviation change shown.




































































































state) in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1 %. Includes
controls for respondent characteristics, state and year fixed effects. Probability is expressed as a
fraction. Marginal effects for one standard deviation change shown.
Fig. Al Associativeness test 2. The solid line represents the point estimates. The dashed lines represent
the 95 percent confidence interval
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Fig. A2 Associativeness test 3. The solid line represents the point estimates. The dashed lines represent
the 95 percent confidence interval
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Chapter 2
The Dynamic Effects of Hurricanes in
the US: The Role of Non-Disaster
Transfer Payments
2.1 Introduction
Extreme weather events are a large and growing source of negative economic shocks. Larger popula-
tion densities, ecosystem alteration, and population movements to hazardous areas are causing real
damages from natural disasters to rise (Board on Natural Disasters, 1999). World insured losses
have exceeded $11 billion per year every year since 1987, reaching $53 billion in 2004 (Kunreuther
and Michel-Kerjan, 2007).1 Economic losses between 1992 and 2001 averaged $49 billion a year
(Freeman et al., 2003). Damages are likely to continue growing as climate change is expected to
increase the number and intensity of extreme events and to change their spatial distribution (Meehl
et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2007). One estimate is that damages will reach $367 billion a year by
2050, a 750 percent increase in real terms (Freeman et al., 2003). However, the economic impacts of
extreme weather are neither predetermined nor random: they depend not only on the meteorological
strength of the event, but also on the policies and infrastructure in place (e.g. Zeckhauser, 1996).
The exogenous cause of a natural catastrophe is weather, but the difference between an extreme
weather event and a disaster is partly man-made. To date, we know very little about the economic
impacts of natural disasters over time or the role of institutions and policy in mitigating them.
Governments spend billions of dollars annually on disaster relief and mitigation programs. And,
although this is rarely discussed in relation to disaster policy, they also fund transfer programs de-
signed for general economic downturns, such as unemployment insurance, welfare, and food stamps.
'Unless stated otherwise, all monetary amounts have been converted to 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price
Index. Uninsured losses are difficult to estimate, but a rule of thumb is that they are at least as large as the insured
losses in developed countries and at least ten times larger in developing ones.
These may in fact act as a buffer when an extreme weather event occurs, even in absence of direct
disaster aid. Ignoring traditional transfer programs would then attribute too much of the resilience
of a developed economy to its wealth or disaster-specific response policies. In addition, the fiscal
cost of disasters will appear smaller than it actually is.
I study the county-level empirical economic effects of hurricanes, which are one of the most
damaging weather events in the US. Specifically, I look at the effects of hurricanes in the 1980's and
1990's from zero to ten years after landfall. I use a simple difference-in-differences framework and
focus on changes in population, earnings, employment, and various transfer payments. In addition,
I semi-parametrically estimate the post-hurricane economic dynamics, which paints a richer picture
of how a county adjusts to this negative shock. My goal is to identify the economic margins
along which adjustment takes place (e.g., population movements versus labor market changes) and
to understand the role of government spending in post-disaster economics within US counties. I
interpret my estimates using a simple spatial equilibrium framework, which suggests that transfers
prevent relocation and generally act as a buffer against both disaster and non-disaster negative
capital shocks. Some of the results in this paper may apply to capital shocks more generally. The
main advantages to using hurricane incidence as an indicator for a capital shock are that hurricanes
are exogenous and their onset is known precisely. This is typically not the case with other types of
capital shocks.
My results suggest that the potential negative economic consequences of the hurricane may
be substantially mitigated through non-disaster social safety net programs. I find that per capita
unemployment insurance payments are on average 22 percent higher in the eleven years following
the hurricane while overall transfer payments are 2.1 percent higher. Correspondingly, there is no
change in population, the employment rate, or wages. In addition to the funds provided through
an official disaster declaration, which average $356 (2008 dollars) per capita per hurricane during
my study period, I estimate that in the eleven years following a hurricane, an affected area receives
transfers from the government to individuals averaging $67 per capita per year or about $640 per
capita in present discounted value. Transfers from businesses to individuals (mostly insurance
payments) increase temporarily as well, but add only an estimated $23 to per capita transfers over
the eleven years. Together, the transfers represent a large fraction of the immediate damages, which
FEMA estimates to be $1, 278 per capita for the major hurricanes during my study period.2 This
suggests that non-disaster policy, in addition to disaster aid and wealth, may be an important factor
in explaining the relative resilience to natural disasters in the United States.
My estimates imply that the fiscal impact of natural disasters is nearly twice as large if non-
disaster transfers are also considered. Although in the simplest public finance framework transfers
are welfare- neutral, in practice the deadweight loss of taxation is estimated to be 12-30% of revenue
(Ballard et al., 1985; Feldstein, 1999). Finally, because transfers are not paid for by the people
receiving them, they may create moral hazard problems, leading individuals to live in riskier places
2Minor hurricanes, which are in my data but not in FEMA's estimates, are generally less damaging.
than they would with actuarially fair insurance. Transfers may be welfare-improving once the
hurricane has occurred but their welfare implications are much less clear in the long run.
I consider the effects of hurricanes on the construction sector because it is a proxy for how
post-hurricane capital adjustment takes place. Although I do find positive effects on construction
wages immediately after the hurricane, employment shrinks three to eight years after the hurricane.
Nine to ten years later, there is a sign of an upward movement in employment, suggesting that the
decline in the construction sector may be temporary. The decline corresponds to a decrease in new
single family home construction. I find suggestive evidence that over time part of the construction
sector activity moves to the neighboring unaffected counties. These results suggest that longer-run
effects should be an important point of focus when studying the effects of idiosyncratic regional
shocks.
I also find evidence of changes in the age structure of the county, but no change in its racial
composition. In particular, there is an increase in the fraction of population under 20 years of age
and a decrease in the fraction of population 65 and older. However, the pattern of these changes
is inconsistent with the transfer increases, implying that the change in transfers is not being driven
by changes in the age structure.
Finally, I look at heterogeneity in the impact of hurricanes by the pre-hurricane median income
and housing value of a county. I find quantitative as well as qualitative differences between counties
in the top and bottom quartiles. Ten years after a hurricane, the increases in per capita unemploy-
ment payments and overall transfers are substantially higher in low-housing value counties than in
high-housing value counties. In addition, trend break and mean shift tests reveal that, although ten
years after a hurricane there is no significant difference in per capita earnings changes between the
bottom and top quartiles, there are differences in their post-hurricane paths.
I contribute to two main strands of the natural disaster literature. The first focuses on the
economic impacts of natural disasters, typically considering a single outcome or single event (Leiter
et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2006) and looking at effects from one to four quarters (Strobl and Walsh,
2008) to three to four years after the event (Murphy and Strobl, 2009). In one of the few studies
to consider long-run effects, Hornbeck (2009) finds that the US Dustbowl had persistent effects on
land values and land use practices. Belasen and Polachek (2008) estimate that earnings in Florida
counties affected by a hurricane increase sharply and remain higher two years after the hurricane.
Brown, Mason, and Tiller (2006) estimate that hurricane Katrina had a negative but temporary
effect on local employment zero to six months after. Strobl (2008) estimates that coastal counties
affected by major hurricanes subsequently experience lower per capita income growth. I add to this
literature by looking at a comprehensive set of outcomes for a large sample of disasters over a longer
time period and connecting the outcomes together in a cohesive framework.
The second related strand of literature examines the importance of area characteristics, institu-
tions and wealth in determining disaster-related losses and deaths (Kahn, 2005; Skidmore and Toya,
2005; Nordhaus, 2006). Skidmore and Toya (2002) find that a higher frequency of climatic disasters
is correlated with higher rates of human capital accumulation. Kahn (2005) finds that a country's
institutional quality is inversely related to the number of disaster-related deaths. I contribute to
this literature by looking at the economic effects of disasters rather than the damages they cause
and by considering the role of transfer payments and within-country heterogeneity.
In the most closely related study, Yang (2008) estimates the effect of hurricanes on international
financial flows and finds that four-fifths of the estimated damages are replaced in poorer countries by
both international aid and remittances. In richer countries, the increase in lending by multilateral
institutions is offset by similar declines in private financial flows. I contribute to this strand of
literature by focusing on the role of non-disaster transfer programs in post-disaster economics. Like
Yang, I consider the impact of hurricanes on monetary transfers but focus on within-country flows
related to social and private insurance.
In addition, there is a literature considering the short-run economic effects of temperature fluc-
tuations (e.g. Dell et al., 2009; Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007a and 2007b; Jones and Olken,
2010) and relating these to climate change. Climate change is forecast to increase the intensity of
hurricanes, which, all else equal, will raise the damages they cause by more than one-for-one. In
this paper, I underscore the additional fiscal and long-term economic impacts which are currently
not incorporated by simple measures of initial damages. My results suggest that climate-induced
hurricane intensification may have larger negative consequences than previously thought. This in
turn implies that the benefits of mitigation, including policies that diminish the effect of climate
change and removal of insurance subsidies, are larger.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework.
Section 3 provides background information on hurricanes and US federal disaster aid. Section 4
describes the setting, data and empirical strategy. Sections 5 and 6 present and discuss the results,
respectively. Section 7 concludes and contains suggestions for further research.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
Hurricanes in the US can be thought of as negative capital shocks; except for Hurricane Katrina,
they do not cause substantial loss of life in the modern US. Thus, I use a simple production function
framework to guide the discussion of the results. I describe how economic outcomes evolve following
a capital shock under various assumptions about moving costs, capital adjustment costs and the
ability of individuals to receive transfer payments instead of working. 3
Suppose that there are many identical locations, so that changes in one location will not have
substantive effects on other locations. Representative firms in each location produce a homogenous
good with some standard production function F (K, L), where K is capital and L is labor. Capital
and labor are complements. Now suppose that one location experiences a negative capital shock.
For a simple formal model and simulation results, see the online "Model Appendix": http://econ-
www.mit.edu/files/6350
Generally, what happens to population, labor supply, and wages depends on capital and individual
mobility costs, as well as the presence of unemployment insurance or other transfer programs. If
capital is perfectly mobile, a capital shock will have no effect on the equilibrium population or any
other economic indicators because adjustment will be immediate. This is regardless of whether
there are individual moving costs or transfer programs.
If capital is not perfectly mobile, there will be observed changes in the local economy. If indi-
viduals face zero moving costs, there will be no change in the wage, but a decline in the population.
This is intuitive: without moving costs, individuals will only stay in the area if they are at least as
well off as before. Because the destruction of capital lowers the wage rate, all else equal, individuals
will respond by decreasing their labor supply until the wage rate is equal to the pre-shock wage.
Because of zero moving costs, decreasing labor supply will be equivalent to moving, as individu-
als who were choosing to work before will simply costlessly switch to another location. Thus, in
the case where capital is not perfectly mobile but individuals are, transfers will play no role in
the post-hurricane dynamics. The degree to which population falls depends on how immobile or
slow-adjusting capital is.
When both capital and individuals are not perfectly mobile, we expect to see a decline in the
wage rate. As long as some of the individuals have negligible moving costs, the population will also
fall. Unlike in the previous case, individuals may also decrease their labor supply without moving
away, so there may be a decline in the employment rate. The relative decline of population and
labor supply depends on the relationship between moving costs and disutility of labor supply. For
example, if both moving costs and disutility of labor supply are high, the fall in the employment
rate relative to the fall in population will be larger than if moving costs are low.
If, in addition to imperfectly mobile capital and imperfectly mobile individuals, there are transfer
payments, the population decline will be weakly smaller than without transfers, while the change in
total labor supply and the wage rate relative to the no transfer case is ambiguous. Per capita labor
supply should fall more as some individuals take the outside option of transfers instead of working.
This will counteract the decrease in wages due to the lower capital. Likewise, some individuals will
chose to take transfers and remain in the area instead of moving away.4 This implies that the net
effect on total labor supply is ambiguous: although labor supply per capita is lower than in the no
transfer case, there are more people remaining in the area relative to the no transfer case.
In Table 1, I summarize the predictions of this framework following a negative capital shock
under various assumptions about the mobility of capital and individuals, as well as the availability
of transfer payments. If capital is perfectly mobile (Columns 1 and 2), a negative capital shock
will have no effect on any economic indicators, regardless of individuals' mobility costs and transfer
availability. If capital is not perfectly mobile, there are no transfers, and moving is costless (first
4Transfer payments can be either a decreasing function of the wage (i.e., compensate individuals living in an
area for lower wages, as in Notowidigdo, 2010) or unemployment insurance payments that the individual can choose
instead of working.
row of Column 3) wages will remain unchanged, but population will fall. In the presence of moving
costs but no transfer payments (first row of Column 4), the fall in the population will be smaller,
while the decline in wages will be larger. When there are employment-related transfer payments
but no moving costs (second row of Column 3), the fall in capital will have the exact same effect as
in the no transfer case and the total amount of transfers going to an area will remain unchanged.
Finally, when there are both transfer payments and moving costs (second row of Column 4), the
fall in utility resulting from a negative capital shock will be buffered by transfers. The presence
of transfers will lead some individuals to cease working while remaining in the area, lowering the
number of people who leave and causing the drop in labor supply to be larger than the drop in
population. The fall in wages will be smaller than in the no-transfer case.
To summarize, if capital is perfectly mobile (or close to it), I expect to find no change in the
economy following a hurricane. If capital is somewhat immobile but individual mobility costs are
negligible, I expect to find decreases in population but no changes in transfer payments. Finally, if
capital adjustment costs and individual moving costs are both non-trivial, transfer payments flowing
into the area should increase. The degree to which population falls will reflect both the magnitude
of the moving costs and the capital adjustment costs.
The presence of transfer payments weakly increases welfare for individuals living in the area
relative to the no transfer case. However, as I discuss later, whether transfer payments increase
social welfare is unclear.
2.3 Hurricanes and Federal Disaster Aid
2.3.1 Hurricanes in the United States
Hurricanes that affect the US form in the Atlantic Ocean. The Atlantic hurricane season lasts from
June through November, with most hurricanes forming in August and September. Warm humid
air over the ocean creates storms known as "tropical disturbances". If circulating winds develop,
the disturbance becomes a tropical cyclone. Prevailing winds and currents move the cyclone across
the ocean, where it gains and loses strength based on the favorability of conditions. When cyclones
encounter cold water or land, they lose strength quickly and dissipate. Sometimes a circular area
with low internal wind speeds, called the "eye", develops in the system's center. Although the entire
storm system can span a few hundred miles, the perimeter of the eye (the "eyewall") is where the
strongest winds are found. Wind intensity declines quickly as one moves away from the eyewall
(or the center of the storm, if there is no eye). The outer parts of the hurricane are called "spiral
bands"; these are characterized by heavy rains but typically do not have hurricane-force winds.
Hurricanes that make it to land create widespread wind and flood damage: physical damages from
hurricanes in the US have averaged $4.4 billion per hurricane (2008 dollars) or $7.4 billion per year
between 1970 and 2005 and $2.2 billion per hurricane or $3.7 billion per year if 2005 is excluded. 5
5Author calculations using data from Nordhaus (2006). I use 2008 dollars throughout the paper.
For hurricane data, I use the Best Tracks (HURDAT) dataset from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).6 It contains the location of the storm center and wind speed
(in six hour intervals) for each North Atlantic cyclone since 1851. To determine which counties the
storm passed through, I assume that the storm path is linear between the given points. Data on
storm width are unfortunately not collected; this adds some measurement error. But because the
eye of the hurricane is typically not very large, and counties through which the eye passes suffer
much more extensive damage (as I show later), this should not be a problem for the estimation.7
Although the hurricane data span a long time period, annual county-level economic data are only
available for 1970-2006. Because the main econometric specification has ten balanced leads and
lags (i.e. each lead and lag is estimated using the same set of hurricanes), I estimate the economic
effects of hurricanes that occurred between 1980 and 1996.
North Atlantic cyclones are classified by maximum 1-minute sustained wind speeds using the
Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale. A storm is considered a hurricane if maximum 1-minute sustained
wind speeds exceed 74 miles per hour. Category 3 and higher hurricanes have wind speeds greater
than 111 mph and are called "major hurricanes". Category 1 and 2 hurricanes are "minor hurri-
canes", characterized by maximum wind speeds of 74 - 110 mph. A tropical storm is a cyclone
with wind speeds of 39 - 73 miles per hour. Cyclones with lower wind speeds are called "tropical
depressions". Between 1980 and 1996, there were on average 5.6 North Atlantic hurricanes per
year, with at least two hurricanes each year and three years with ten or more hurricanes. About a
third (1.9 out of 5.6) of hurricanes are major hurricanes. Less than a third (1.5 out of 5.6) of all
hurricanes that form make landfall, and about half of the landfalling hurricanes (0.7 out of 1.5) are
major hurricanes.
US hurricanes are geographically concentrated. Most of the landfalling hurricanes over this
time period occur in Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia (hereafter the "hurricane region"). Figure 1 shows the geographic
distribution of hurricane hits that occurred between 1980 and 1996, as well as the control counties
used in subsequent analysis (selected using propensity score matching). Out of the hurricane region
counties, 127 experience one or more hurricanes between 1980 and 1996 (119 experience only one
hurricane). Only 19 counties outside the hurricane region experience any hurricanes during this
time and virtually all the major hurricanes occur within the 9 states listed above. I therefore limit
my analysis to this region. Although it may be preferable to focus on the major hurricanes, they
are relatively rare (there are only 8 between 1980 and 1996). For this reason, I focus on the 21
minor and major hurricanes that affected the hurricane region during that time.
6 Available from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastall.shtml#hurdat
7 See Appendix A for a discussion of the distribution of eye diameters.
2.3.2 Destructiveness of Hurricanes
In order to gauge the potential economic impact of hurricanes, it is helpful to look at the damages
they cause in absolute terms and relative to other US disasters.
To provide evidence on the absolute level of damages caused by hurricanes, I use estimates of
direct damages from HAZUS-MH, published by FEMA. 8 Table 2 shows the summary statistics of
the effects of the eight major hurricanes that affected the hurricane region between 1980 and 1996.
HAZUS-MH is software meant to help state, local, and Federal government officials prepare for
disasters and to help the private sector estimate risk exposure. The software combines scientific
and engineering knowledge with detailed historic data to produce damage estimates that are likely
to be more accurate than those made using simpler estimates or reports. In addition to simulating
hypothetical damages, HAZUS contains highly detailed damage estimates of past major hurricanes.
These damage estimates are shown in Table 2.
Panel A summarizes the estimated effects in the counties which, according to the Best Tracks
data, were in the path of the hurricane's center (I refer to these as "centrally affected" counties).
On average, these counties suffered $406 million in damages to buildings (with a standard deviation
of about $2 billion) or about 1.46% (with a standard deviation of 3.85%) of the total building value.
The maximum county-level building damage was $20 billion while the maximum loss as a percent
of total building value was 23.6%.
HAZUS-MH also provides estimates of non-structural losses, such as building content and in-
ventory losses, as well as estimates of the number of households displaced by the disaster. Total
losses (including building damages) average $571 million per county with a standard deviation of
$3.7 billion. The largest total loss on a county level over this period was $35.4 billion. On average,
about 1,500 households (with a standard deviation of 10,700) are displaced as a result of a central hit
by a major hurricane and 450 people require temporary shelter. Per capita total damages average
$1, 280 with a standard deviation of about $3, 340.
Panel B shows the estimated effects of the hurricane on counties that are listed as affected in
the FEMA simulations but do not have the center of the storm passing through them ("peripherally
affected" counties). The damage estimates are much smaller. For example, the average damage
to buildings is only $8.6 million or about 65 times smaller than the average damage in a centrally
affected county. The maximum damage in peripherally affected counties is $390 million, which is
smaller than the mean damage in centrally affected counties. The average loss ratio is 0.15%, which
is about 10 times smaller than the loss ratio in centrally affected counties. Per capita total losses
are also about 10 times smaller, averaging $113 per capita, and total losses are about 50 times
smaller. Only 12 households are estimated to be displaced, on average, and only 3 people require
temporary shelter. Thus, although the omission of these counties from the analysis may introduce
some measurement error, it should not affect the estimates much.
The above estimates provide evidence both on the level of a hurricane's damage and on the
8Available by request from http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/hazus/index.shtm
likely importance of including counties not directly in the storm's path. It should be noted that
the damage estimates are an upper bound on the average destructiveness of the hurricanes in my
sample because my sample includes minor as well as major hurricanes. Unfortunately, FEMA does
not provide detailed damage estimates for minor hurricanes. A theoretical result is that the energy
carried by the wind increases with the third power of wind speed. The average maximum wind speed
in a county that was centrally affected by a major hurricane between 1980 and 1996 is 124 miles per
hour, while the average maximum wind speed in a county centrally affected by a minor hurricane
is 86 miles per hour. If the power carried by the wind translates directly into destructiveness, a
back of the envelope calculation implies that a 124 miles per hour hurricane would cause about
three times more damage than an 86 miles per hour hurricane. This, in turn, would imply that
the average minor hurricane in my sample caused about $190 million in total damages per centrally
affected county. Although this is not as large as the damage caused by major hurricanes, it is a
non-trivial amount for a local economy and may affect subsequent economic outcomes.
I now address the relative damages caused by hurricanes. I regress three different damage
statistics on measures of hurricane strength and other natural event indicators. The regression
specifications are as follows:
Det = ac + at + f31 Major _hurricanect + 32 Minor _hurricaneet
+'y1Floodct + y2Tornadoct + y3 Severe_stormet + ect
and
5
Det = ac + at + ( ,3,l [Categoryct = k] + 'y1Floodet
k=1
+7 2Tornadoct + 73 Severe _stormet + Ect
c = county; t = year
Det is log of property damages, property damages per capita or the log of flood insurance
payments in that county. ' All damage measures are in 2008 dollars. Majorhurricanect is an
indicator for Category 3, 4, and 5 storms, while Minorhurricaneet is an indicator for Category
1 and 2 storms. 1 [Categoryct = k] is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the hurricane is classified
as a Category k hurricane. Because there are very few Category 4 and 5 hurricanes, I combine
9Data on damages and extreme weather events other than hurricanes are from the Hazards & Vulnerability
Research Institute (2009) and are based on weather service reports by local government officials. Data on flood
claims and liabilities are from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR).
them in the second equation. The Flood, Tornado, and Severestorm indicators are equal to 1
if the county was reported as having at least one of these events over the year. These, along with
hurricanes, are the most common and damaging meteorological events in the US. Other rarer events
in the region include droughts, wildfires, and heat. Thus, the reference category is a combination of
these extreme events and no reported extreme events. Finally, ac and at are county and year fixed
effects.
I estimate these two equations for the nine states in the hurricane region. 10 The results are
shown in Table 3. Column 1 compares the log of damages for different disasters. A major hurricane
increases the reported property damages by 4.2 log points or over 400%. In levels, this implies that
a major hurricane increases the total damages in a county by about $760,000 (2008 dollars). The
next most damaging event is a minor hurricane, which increases property damages by 2.4 log points
or about $110, 000. In contrast, tornadoes, floods, and severe storms increase property damages
by 2.1 ($76,000), 0.9 ($15,000), and 1.0 ($18,000) log points (dollars), respectively. A similar
pattern holds when the dependent variable is property damages per capita, although some of the
point estimates become statistically insignificant. This is possibly because hurricane-prone counties
are more populous. Column 4 shows the effect of hurricanes broken down by category. As expected,
Category 1 hurricanes are the least damaging, causing an extra 2.2 log points of damage ($84,000),
while Category 4 and 5 storms are the most damaging, increasing property damages by 4.6 log
points ($1, 100, 000). The least damaging hurricane is about as damaging as a tornado, and more
damaging than a flood or severe storm.
An important caveat is that the damage measures are estimates made by local officials soon after
the occurrence of the event. Using hurricane-level damage data from Nordhaus (2006), I estimate
the direct damages from hurricanes to be about $3.7 billion per year between 1970 and 2004, in 2008
dollars. Given that there are on average 1.5 landfalling hurricanes per year, the estimates in this
section appear to understate the per-county damage of hurricanes (and possibly of other disasters
as well) by at least a factor of ten. However, as long as the damage measurements do not exhibit
differential bias for hurricanes, floods, storms, and tornadoes, these numbers are valid for comparing
the relative magnitudes of the different events.
Column 3 shows the effect of various extreme weather events on flood payments. Major hurri-
canes increase flood claims by about 3.1 log points or about $1.1 million, while minor hurricanes
increase them by 1.5 log points or about $190, 000. The mean insurance liability in the sample is
$538 million. Tornadoes have no significant impact on flood claims and the estimated effect of a
severe storm is significantly negative." Floods increase claims by only about 0.5 percentage points.
When the effect of a hurricane is broken down further, Category 3 storms are estimated to
have the largest effect, raising flood insurance payments by about 3.1 log points. Category 1 and 2
"The results for all US counties are similar.
"The comparison category is not "no extreme weather event", but a combination of this indicator and other,
rarer, weather events. Some of these, such as heat waves, may be more damaging than the average severe storm.
hurricanes raise flood-related insurance payments by 1.1 and 2.8 log points, respectively. Category
4 and 5 storms increase them by 3 log points.
The flood insurance payments are likely to be a lower bound on total insurance payments for
two reasons. First, in addition to flood damage, the wind associated with hurricanes creates massive
damage, which is covered by homeowner's insurance. Second, the fiscal year of the US government
ends on September 30th. Some flood insurance claims originating in August and September (the
peak hurricane time) may be settled in the same fiscal year, while some may not appear until
the following year. Despite all the caveats, these estimates imply that hurricanes are the most
destructive of the common US disasters, which makes them an important phenomenon to study.
2.3.3 Federal Disaster Aid
This section summarizes US federal disaster spending between 1980 and 1996. Federal disaster aid
is given to a county if the state's governor files a request and provides evidence that the state cannot
handle the disaster on its own. The final decision about whether to declare a disaster is made by the
US President. If the request is approved, federal money can be used to repair public structures and
to make individual and business grants and loans. Grants to individuals are made only up to the
amount of uninsured damages. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) also provides
personnel, legal help, counseling, and special unemployment insurance for people unemployed due
to the disaster. Although there is some long-term recovery spending in extreme cases, most of
the transfers to individuals occur within six months of the declaration and most of the public
infrastructure spending occurs within two-three years (FEMA, personal communication).
Between 1980 and 1996, the federal government spent $6.4 billion (2008 dollars) on hurricane-
related disaster aid and $23.1 billion on other disasters.1 2 The bulk of the non-hurricane disaster
spending ($10.1 billion) was due to the Northridge earthquake in 1994. Excluding the Northridge
earthquake implies that hurricane-related spending accounts for about a third of all disaster aid.
This number includes all declaration-related spending by FEMA, including assistance given for
infrastructure repair, individual grants, as well as mitigation spending. The Small Business Admin-
istration also offers subsidized loans to affected individuals and businesses, which are not included
here. Spending by the state and local governments is also excluded. By law, the state pays some of
the cost of disaster aid, but its share cannot exceed 25%. Thus, state spending comprises at most a
third of the federal spending. Unfortunately, annual county data on disaster spending over time is
not available, so I cannot incorporate disaster spending into my main empirical framework. How-
ever, there are data that allow me to directly compute the county-by-hurricane amount of disaster
transfers.
Table 4 shows the summary statistics for federal aid related to hurricanes between 1980 -
1996.13 Because data on federal disaster aid is provided on the level of a declaration, which includes
2 Data on spending are from the PERI Presidential Disaster Declarations database (Sylves and Racca, 2010).
3 Summary statistics for other times periods are similar, with the caveat that real spending on hurricane-related
multiple counties in a state, an assumption about how the money is divided among counties is
necessary. As I show in the previous section, counties through which the center of the storm passes
experience much more damage than peripherally affected counties. Therefore, a natural assumption
is that the money is split among only those counties and the rest can be ignored. Another natural
assumption is that the money is divided among the included counties in proportion to the population
in each county. Panel A shows the total and per capita federal aid transfers assuming that only
centrally affected counties are given aid. The average amount of aid given to counties experiencing
hurricanes was $58.7 million. Counties experiencing major hurricanes received about 2.5 times as
much on average, $128 - 133 million. The standard deviations of aid for counties that experienced
hurricanes are all larger than the mean, ranging from $187 to over $460 million. Note that this
period excludes Hurricane Katrina and the 2004 hurricane season, in which four hurricanes affected
Florida. Thus, even "business as usual" hurricane seasons are associated with non-trivial amounts
of federal spending.
Per capita spending in 1980-1996 averaged $356 per hurricane and $412 per major hurricane
(2008 dollars). An extreme assumption of a uniform split across counties (which is unlikely to be
true) leads to a larger per-capita average of $1,137 per hurricane and $2,018 per major hurricane.
Panel B shows the same statistics assuming that the money is divided among all counties included
in the declaration, not just centrally affected ones. This implies spending of $8.4 - 8.9 million per
county, $24.6 - 30.0 million per centrally affected county, and $59.2 - 73.4 million per county
centrally affected by a major hurricane. Per capita spending estimates range from $52 to $187 in
the proportional split case and from $160 to $954 in the uniform split case.
In the results section, I use the preferred number of $356 per capita as a benchmark to compare
spending by disaster relief agencies to the extra spending associated with the hurricane triggering
other transfer programs.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Sample of Analysis
Ideally, one would estimate the effect of hurricanes by looking at differences over time between
counties in the hurricane region that do and do not experience a hurricane between 1980 and 1996.
However, finding a valid control group is not straightforward. In Table 5, I compare characteristics
and trends of counties that do not experience any hurricanes between 1980 and 1996 with counties
that experience one hurricane.14
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A show the 1970 characteristics of hurricane region counties that
experience a hurricane between 1980 and 1996 and the difference from counties with no hurricanes.
declarations is rising over time.
141 omit the few counties that experience more than one hurricane between 1980 and 1996. Results are similar if
counties with more than one hurricane are included.
Nearly fifty percent of 119 counties that experience one hurricane are coastal, compared to forty-one
percent of 811 counties that have not had hurricanes over this period. Counties that experience
hurricanes are about fifty percent more populous than non-hurricane counties and have lower popu-
lation densities. These differences are statistically significant (as shown in Column 3). Counties with
hurricanes also have larger per unemployment insurance payments, but smaller per capita transfers
from the federal government. However, differences in levels are not problematic because county
fixed effects are included in every specification. However, differences in levels may be indicative
of differences in trends. In Panel A, I test for differential trends between 1970 and 1979 (before
any hurricanes in the sample occur) for the time-varying characteristics. In this case, Columns 1
and 2 show the trend in the hurricane counties and their difference from the trend in non-hurricane
counties. Only two variables show differential trends for these two groups of counties: per capita
transfers from government and per capita family assistance, both significant at the 5% level.
Another way to construct the control group is by requiring balance in pre-hurricane covariates
and hurricane risk.15 I construct a hurricane risk variable using historic (1981-1970) hurricane data.
I predict counties' propensity to be hit by hurricanes by spatially smoothing observed hurricane
hits. I then use two-nearest neighbor propensity score matching to select a control group from
the no-hurricane sample. 16 Column 4 shows the difference between the hurricane counties and
the propensity matched control group, while Column 5 shows the p-value of this difference. In
general, propensity score matching eliminates differences in levels and trends for all variables except
population, whose trend and level differences continue to be significant at the 5% level. Because
the sample in Column 4 is more similar to the treatment group than the sample in Column 2, I use
the former as my preferred control group.
I discuss results using other samples in the robustness section (including using only the counties
that experience a hurricane between 1980 and 1996). I show that these do not affect the estimates
qualitatively and have only a moderate quantitative effect. I also address the problem of potentially
different time trends by relying on mean shift and trend break tests.
2.4.2 Economic and Demographic Data
Annual county-level outcomes such as unemployment payments, population, and earnings come from
either the Regional Economic Information System (REIS), while sector-specific employment, wages
and number of establishments come from County Business Patterns (CBP). County-level population
by race and age are from Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results (SEER) population database.
Data on single family housing starts are from McGraw-Hill. All four series span the years 1970-2006.
"
5Matching is based on all outcome variables, although some are not shown due to space constraints.
16Using two-nearest neighbor rather than nearest neighbor matching ensures that the number of counties in the
control group is approximately equal to the number of counties in the treatment group. When nearest neighbor
matching is used, some non-hurricane counties are assigned as nearest neighbors multiple times, resulting in a control
group that's much smaller than the treatment group.
I define the employment rate as the ratio of total employment to the number of people aged
fifteen and older.17 An establishment is defined as a single physical location of a firm with paid
employees. Net earnings by place of residence (which I later refer to as simply "net earnings") include
wage and salary disbursements, supplements to wages and salaries, and proprietors' income, less
contributions for government social insurance. Earnings do not include transfer payments. Earnings
by place of work are converted to earnings by residence by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
using a statistical adjustment. On average, the construction sector represents slightly over 10% of
all establishments, employees, and wages.
Unemployment insurance compensation consists primarily of standard state-administered unem-
ployment insurance schemes, but also includes unemployment compensation for federal employees,
railroad workers, and veterans. Total transfers from government to individuals include unemploy-
ment insurance. In addition, the category includes income maintenance (e.g., Supplemental Secu-
rity Income or SSI), family assistance, retirement and disability insurance benefits, medical benefits
(Medicare and Medicaid), veterans' benefits, and federal education and training assistance. Trans-
fers from businesses to individuals consist primarily of net insurance settlements and personal injury
liability payments to non-employees.
Disaster-related transfers are technically included in the measure of total transfers from the
government. However, these are computed by assuming that national estimates are distributed in
proportion to population to all the counties in the US. Thus, these will not affect the estimation
once year fixed effects are included.
2.4.3 Event Study Regression Framework
In this section, I outline the procedure used to estimate the economic effects of a hurricane. I first
employ an event study framework. Specifically, I regress outcomes on hurricane indicators 10 years
before and after a hurricane, controlling for county, year, and coastal-by-year fixed effects. It would
be ideal to estimate the effects of major and minor hurricanes separately, but there are too few major
hurricanes for a precise estimation of their effect. 18 Thus, I focus on the effect of all hurricanes.
The identifying assumption is that, conditional on the location and the year, the occurrence of
a hurricane is uncorrelated with unobservables. This is reasonable because even forecasting the
severity of the hurricane season as a whole is difficult, much less the paths those hurricanes will
take. Although there is no cause to believe that hurricanes are endogenous when proper controls
are included, I estimate the leads of a hurricane to test for the presence of differential trends.
The basic event study framework for estimating the year-by-year effect of a hurricane up to ten
years after its occurrence is:
1 7 Annual county-level unemployment rates are not available until 1990.
18If I restrict the sample to estimate ten leads and lags using the same county-hurricane-year observations, I end
up with less than 30 counties that experience major hurricanes. In contrast, there are 119 counties that experience
a major or minor hurricane when the same restrictions are imposed.
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Oct Z , #3Hc,t-T + 0c1'+# c 1 + ac + at + 1 [coastal] at + 8 ct (2.1)
T=-10
c = county; t = year; r = lag
Oct is some economic outcome, as described in the data section. Het is a hurricane indicator, equal
to 1 if the county is reported to have experienced any hurricane in year t, according to the NOAA
Best Tracks data. I normalize the effect the year before the hurricane, T = -1, to zero. {#-3c4'ct}
are indicators for hurricanes outside the estimation window. a, and at are county and year fixed
effects.
1 [coastal] at is a set of year fixed effects for coastal counties, as defined by the NOAA's Strategic
Environmental Assessments Division. Including this interaction term is necessary because coastal
counties are more likely to experience hurricanes and may experience different growth trajectories.
For example, the population data show that the coastal population has grown disproportionately
in the past 30 years.
I combine hurricane indicators into two-year bins to increase the power of the estimation.1 9 The
combined lags are years 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, 7 and 8, 9 and 10. The combined leads are -1 and
-2, -3 and -4, -5 and -6, -7 and -8, -9 and -10. The assumption needed for this estimation procedure
to be valid is that the effects of a hurricane for the years that are grouped together have the same
sign and distribution. Year 0, which is the year that the hurricane makes landfall in a county, is not
combined because the assumption that the effects in year 0 and year 1 are similar may not hold.
-1
Oct = oHet + #3-2- max {H,t-2THc,t-2r-1} (2.2)
r=-5
5
+ 0~/-2- max {H,t-2r+1, Hc,t-2T}
+#ct2 + #011 + ac + at + 1 [coastal] at + sct
The coefficient 0 corresponds to year 0, which is the year in which the hurricane makes landfall
in the county. For example, 1989 is year 0 for Hurricane Hugo, one of the hurricanes in my sample,
and 1992 is year 0 for Hurricane Andrew.
The notation for the hurricane bins is unconventional, but straightforward. max {H,t-2r+1, Hc,t-2}
takes the maximum of the county's hurricane indicators in subsequent years, grouping them as de-
scribed above. The set E #-2T max {H,t-2+1, H,t-2r} thus represents the causal effects of a
19Results using year-by-year hurricane indicators are qualitatively similar, but noisier. The full set of results is
available upon request.
hurricane 1-10 years following its occurrence. It can be written out as m-2 Max {He,t1, Hc,t- 2} +
m-4 Max {He,t- 3 , H,t_4} ... + #-10 max {He,t-9, He,t_10}. The reference category is "hurricane
one or two years from now", corresponding to max {He,t+, He,t+2}. The coefficients of interest is
the set of hurricane lags {#-2,} and the estimated immediate impact of a hurricane, #0. The
average effect of combined years -1 and -2 is assumed to be 0, so the estimated coefficients should
be interpreted as the change relative to the two years before the hurricane.
I do not use damages estimates as the independent variable for several reasons. County-level
property damage estimates between 1960 and 2009 are available from the Spatial Hazard Events and
Losses Database (SHELDUS) .20 To my knowledge, this is the only database that contains county-
level damage estimates for all hurricanes over this period of time. However, the data are estimates
made by local emergency officials fairly close to the time of occurrence. At best, they appear to be
very imprecise, as discussed in Section 3. Second, damage is not only a function of the hurricane's
strength, but of local characteristics such as construction practices and population density, which
may be correlated with economic trajectories. Finally, damages may be endogenous with respect to
the variable of interests. For example, communities with lower chances of recovery may be damaged
relatively more because of poor construction. The county with heavier damages, all else equal, may
be in decline or may be less prepared to deal with the disaster overall. Alternatively, the county
with larger absolute damages may be more affluent and able to recover more quickly (for example,
because of better access to credit, coordination, or governance).
Because there may be unobserved heterogeneity across hurricanes, I also restrict the sample of
hurricanes to those for which I can estimate the full set of leads and lags. In practice, this means I
am estimating the effects using hurricanes that occurred between 1980 and 1996. To maximize my
sample size, I create indicator variables for the county 10 years before and after it experienced a
hurricane that was taken out of the sample (i.e., counties that were affected between 1960-1979 and
1997-2006). This allows me to exclude certain county-year observations from the estimation without
excluding the county completely. I also restrict my sample to counties that have a continuous record
for each outcome variable in order to avoid biasing my results.
Many of the outcome variables are autocorrelated as well as correlated with each other. Appendix
B shows the empirical auto- and cross-correlation in the outcome variables. The autocorrelation
creates multicollinearity concerns, which is why it is useful to rely on joint tests of significance to
determine whether there are significant effects.
2.4.4 Differences in Differences Regression Framework
The basic results suggest that hurricanes may have an effect on the mean of the economic variable,
its trend, or both. In addition to estimating the effect for each time period, I also test for trend
breaks and mean shifts in the outcome variable. The trend break specification tests for a change in
the slope of the economic outcome after the hurricane, while the mean shift specification tests for
20Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2009). Available from http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/products/sheldus.aspx
a change in the mean, assuming that there is no change in trend. These specifications summarize
the net effect of a hurricane more concisely and are more powerful when the assumption of linear
trends holds. In addition, if the assumption of parallel trends does not hold, the trend break test is
useful for determining whether the hurricane has a significant impact on the economy.
The regression equation for testing for a mean shift controlling for an overall time trend is:
Oct= 1 * 1[Hurr in past 10 years]ct + #"post11ct + #- 11 prellet (2.3)
+Y 11[Hurr within 10 years]ctt + 72 1[Hurr outside 10 years]ctt
+ac + at + 1 [coastal] at + ect
Oct is some economic outcome, such as population or the employment rate. 1[Hurr in past 10
years]ct is an indicator variable equal to 1 if county c has experienced a hurricane in the ten years
prior to and including t. Thus, 01 is the variable of interest, representing the average change in
the outcome in the eleven years after the hurricane (the year of the hurricane and ten subsequent
years).
Because my data span a large time period, including a single linear trend variable may be
overly restrictive. Thus, I separately control for the trend in the ten years before and eleven years
following and including the hurricane year with the variable 1[Hurr within 10 years]ctt. 1[Hurr
within 10 years]ct is an indicator equal to 1 if county c experienced a hurricane in the ten years
before or in the ten years after time t. y2, the coefficient on 1[Hurr outside 10 years]ct, controls for
the overall trend in hurricane counties outside of the twenty-one year window of interest.
I include indicator variables post11ct and pre11ct to ensure that I am comparing the eleven-year
post-hurricane mean to the ten-year pre-hurricane mean. These are equal to 1 if county c in year
t experienced a hurricane eleven or more years ago or will experience a hurricane eleven or more
years in the future. As before, I control for county, year, and coastal-county-by-year fixed effects
with ac, at, and 1 [coastal] at.
The growth rate in outcomes may also be affected by a hurricane. To test for a change in the
linear trend following a hurricane (i.e., a trend break model), I add an additional variable to the
equation above:
Oct = 1 * 1[Hurr in past 10 years]ct + 02 * 1[Hurr in past 10 years]ctt (2.4)
+y11[Hurr within 10 years]cet + -y2 1[Hurr outside 10 years]ctt
+/ 1 1post11ct + /- 1 1 pre11ct + ac + at + 1 [coastal] at + Ect
1[Hurr in past 10 years]ctt is the interaction of the eleven-year post-hurricane indicator with
year. As above, 1[Hurr within 10 years]ctt controls for the average trend in the ten years before
and ten years after the hurricane. Because I want to compare trends ten years before the hurricane
to eleven years after, I include indicators for hurricanes (post11ct and pre11ct) as well as linear
hurricane-specific trends (1[Hurr outside 10 years]ctt) outside of this window of interest.
The test for a mean shift without a trend break amounts to testing 01 = 0 in equation (2.3),
while the test for a mean shift with a trend break amounts to testing 01 = 0 and 02 = 0 in equation
(2.4). For the trend break test, I also calculate the hurricane-driven change in the outcome five years
after the hurricane (the year of the hurricane and four subsequent years) and eleven years after the
hurricane (the year of the hurricane and ten subsequent levels). This is equivalent to calculating
01 + 5 * 02 for the five-year change and 01 + 10 * 02 for the eleven-year change. Note that the mean
shift test restricts the hurricane-driven change to be identical in each year following the hurricane.
2.4.5 Heterogeneity of Effects by Wealth
Understanding the determinants of the post-disaster economic trajectory is important for policy
design. The wealth of an area, such as income and house values, is likely to be important in
determining how its economics are affected by a hurricane. The poor typically have lower access
to credit. If they cannot borrow, their labor supply or mobility response following a capital shock
may differ from richer individuals. Specifically, credit constraints can cause the poor to supply
labor inefficiently or prevent them from moving, which exacerbates the negative welfare effect of
the initial shock. Other factors can also be at play: for example, Masozera et al. (2007) find that
poor neighborhoods are less likely to have flood insurance and vehicles, suggesting that they may
have a harder time dealing with the disaster's aftermath.
Whether wealth is measured by house values or median income may matter for the estimated
heterogeneity in post-hurricane economics because hurricanes destroy housing. The median home
value may be a good proxy for the absolute level of the wealth shock experienced by an area's
residents. Income could be an important predictor of post-disaster economics because it may proxy
for borrowing constraints, among other things.
To look at the effects of wealth on post-hurricane dynamics, I interact the county's quartile
for (a) 1970 median housing value and (b) 1970 median income with the hurricane indicator ten
years before and after its occurrence. The data on income and housing values are from the Census.
As in the main trend break and mean shift specifications, I compare the means and trends of low
and high-income counties before and after the hurricane. First, I estimate a mean shift model that
allows for an overall time trend, but has no differential time trends after the hurricane:
Oct = OP * 1[Hurr in past 10 years]ct * TOPgyo (2.5)
+1O0O * 1[Hurr in past 10 years]ct * BOT 97 0
+Controlset + Ect
Oct is some economic outcome, as before. TOP 9 70 is an indicator equal to 1 if the county was
in the top quartile in 1970 while BOToy0 is the corresponding indicator for being in the bottom
quartile. Thus, the changes in the mean are relative to counties that are in the two middle quartiles.
To test for a differential change in the mean, I compare the estimated mean shift for the counties in
the upper quartile of income (OfOP) to the mean shift in the bottom quartile (010T). Specifically,
I compute 6OBT - 6TOP and whether this is statistically different from 0. Controlset ensures that I
am comparing the ten year pre-hurricane means to the eleven year post-hurricane means. It includes
a quartile-specific trend variable for the 21-year window around the hurricane (minus ten years to
plus ten years), as well as a set of year, county, and coastal-by-year fixed effects, indicators for
hurricanes outside the time window of interest, and trends outside the window of interest.
In order to test for a trend break, it is necessary to add two more variables which capture
post-hurricane changes in the trend by quartile:
Oct = OTOP * 1[Hurr in past 10 years]ct * TOPf9 70  (2.6)
±gBOT * 1[Hurr in past 10 years]ct * BOT 9 7 0
+62j'1 [Hurr in past 10 years]ct * TOPf970t
+02 T1[Hurr in past 10 years]ct * BOT 97 0 t
+Controlset + ect
To test for a differential change in the top and bottom quartile counties, I compare the 10-
year change in the top quartile (QfOP + 10 * O2'OP) to the 10-year change in the bottom quartile
(0 BT + 10 * 0 OT). As in trend break equation (2.4), Controlsct ensures that I am estimating
trend changes in the eleven years after the hurricane relative to the ten years before and includes
the same set of fixed effects and quartile-specific trends. In addition to the variables included for
equation (2.5), it includes quartile-specific post-hurricane indicators to allow for a mean shift.
Due to the small sample of hurricanes and affected counties, it is difficult to estimate the im-
portance of these variables precisely, so these results should be taken as suggestive. Note that the
quartile indicators also capture other differences between areas, such as race and other demograph-
ics. This means that the estimated coefficient should not be interpreted as the marginal effect of
having more expensive housing, but as the effect on the average high housing value county in the
hurricane region.
The average median family income in a county that experienced one hurricane between 1980
and 1996 is $40, 000 (2008 dollars), with a standard deviation of $9, 595. The bottom ten percent of
counties has median incomes of $30,991 and lower, while the top ten percent has median incomes
of $51,954 and higher. The variation in median housing values is similar, with a mean of $59, 297,
a standard deviation of $17, 585, and tenth and ninetieth percentiles of $37, 894 and $82, 580, re-
spectively. The distribution of median family income and housing values for the hurricane region
as a whole is similar.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Dynamic Effects of Hurricanes
In this section, I present the estimated effects of a hurricane. I graph the coefficients from equation
(2.2) in Section 4. Because the results suggest that hurricanes have lasting effects and that there
may be some differential pre-trends, following each figure is a table with the results of the trend
break and mean shift tests described in equations (2.3) and (2.4). All monetary figures are in
2008 dollars. Standard errors are clustered by county. Each regression includes year, county, and
year-by-coastal fixed effects, as well as indicators for hurricanes occurring outside of the estimation
window of interest. The point estimates from the figures are shown in Appendix Tables A1-A4.
The disaggregated results and the trend break/mean shift estimates are complementary. The
trend break and mean shift tests may pick up effects that are not detectable in a single year.
However, they may miss non-monotonic dynamic effects. Thus, I view both as important in under-
standing post-hurricane economics.
Figure 2 shows the impact of a hurricane on the construction sector, measured in terms of
employment, wages, and the number of firm locations. In addition, I present estimates of changes
in per capita single family home construction. The y-axis shows the estimated coefficient and
the 95% confidence interval. The x-axis represents the number of years since the hurricane; thus,
negative numbers refer to leads of the hurricane variable. Because the coefficients are estimated from
two-year bin variables, they are plotted at the midpoint of the two years (e.g., the point estimate for
1 and 2 years post-hurricane is plotted at 1.5 years). The coefficient for the two-year bin grouping
years -1 and -2 (one and two years before the hurricane) is assumed to be 0.
Looking at the effects of the hurricane on the construction sector is useful for determining
whether there are any effects of a hurricane that are observable a year or more after the event.
Overall, these estimates clearly show that there are significant effects of a hurricane years after
its occurrence. After remaining unchanged in the year of the hurricane, employment falls to 7 -
19% below pre-hurricane levels (implying 70 - 170 fewer construction workers) .21 The number of
establishments is about 3.2% higher in the year of the hurricane and 3.7% higher the subsequent year
(implying 2 - 3 more construction establishments. They subsequently return to their pre-hurricane
levels. Construction wages increase in years 1 - 4, by 5.4 - 7.7% ($1, 400 - 2, 000), suggesting there
may be a change in the composition of labor demand (e.g., more demand for specialized workers)
or lower labor supply. The overall decline indicates a drop in construction demand three to eight
years later: either less housing is being built or existing housing is being repaired less. This is
possibly due to repairs being moved up temporally because of the hurricane. However, it is not
21I estimate this by computing e(M1+) - e(, where p is the mean of the outcome and 3 is the estimated effect
of the hurricane I years ago. This gives the approximate hurricane-driven change for logged variables.
clear whether the decline is temporary; nine to ten years later, the construction sector employment
is still significantly lower than the year before the hurricane, but appears to be slowly increasing.
Per capita single family housing starts are 5.7% lower in the year of the hurricane and 9.7% lower
3-4 years later (implying 0.2 -0.4 fewer housing units per 1,000 people), with no significant changes
in other years. The hurricane lags are jointly significant at the 1% level for all the outcomes.
Table 6 shows the mean shift and trend break test results corresponding to Figure 2. There is a
significant trend break in construction employment, establishments, and per worker wages, and the
estimated coefficients follow the pattern seen in Figure 2. Specifically, the number of construction
firm locations (establishments) declines by 1.3% each year. Construction employment is on average
9.0% lower in the ten years following the hurricane, and declines by 2.0% per year. Wages increase
by an average of 7.0%, but then fall by an additional 1.1% each year. From the trend break
specification, I estimate that construction employment is 19% lower five years after the hurricane
and 29% lower at the end of my estimation sample, ten years after landfall.
One possible interpretation of the decline in the local construction sector is spatial; the con-
struction activity may have simply shifted to nearby counties without any aggregate effect. The
implications of spatial changes, while non-trivial for the local economy, are different than if there's a
general downturn in the housing market. However, I also estimate that per capita housing starts fall
by about 7.6% on average, which indicates a substantial decrease in construction demand. Thus,
the downturn in the local construction sector is not solely driven by spatial shifts in construction
activity.
Figure 3 shows the estimated effect of a hurricane on population and demographics. Population
does not change significantly in any given year and the effects of a hurricane zero to ten years after
are not jointly significant. The fraction of black residents is significantly lower in the years after the
hurricane, but pre-trends suggest that further testing is necessary. The fraction of residents who
are 65 and older falls steadily following the hurricane, while the fraction of those under 20 years of
age steadily grows.
Trend break and mean shift tests in Table 8 indicate that there are no significant changes in the
mean or trend of population or the fraction of residents who are black. There is indeed evidence
of a change in the age structure of the county. In particular, the fraction of population under 20
is 0.0036 higher 10 years after the hurricane, a 1% increase. The fraction over 65 is 0.0058 lower,
a 4.7% decrease relative to the mean. These changes are significant at the 10% and 5% levels,
respectively.
Figure 4 shows the effect of a hurricane on the employment rate, earnings, and transfers. There
is no change in the employment rate. Per capita net earnings by residents and the employment rate
show a significant pre-hurricane trend, as evidenced by the significance of the joint test of hurricane
leads, but no change following the hurricane. Overall per capita transfers from the government to
individuals increase by 1.2% in the year of the hurricane and are 1.8 - 2.5% larger in subsequent
years. Per capita transfers to individuals from businesses immediately increase by 11.6% following
a hurricane.
In Table 8, I show the results of the mean shift and trend break tests for the outcomes shown
in Figure 4. The mean shift test indicates a 2% average increase in per capita government to
individual transfers, equivalent to about $67 per person per year. Per capita business to individual
transfers in the eleven years following the hurricane are estimated to be 3% higher than the pre-
hurricane transfers, or about $2.4 per year. There are no significant changes in the trends of any of
these variables. Assuming a 3% discount rate, the present discounted value (PDV) of all government
transfers is about $640 per capita, and the PDV of transfers from businesses is $23 per capita. Thus,
post-hurricane transfers from general social programs are larger than transfers from disaster-specific
programs and much larger than insurance payments.
Figure 6 looks at specific types of government transfers: namely, family assistance, public medical
benefits (i.e., Medicaid and Medicare), SSI payments, and unemployment insurance. Per capita
unemployment insurance payments increase immediately by 14.2% and are 18 - 30% higher in years
one through ten after a hurricane. Family assistance payments are 2.9% lower in the year of the
hurricane, but subsequently rise to 7 - 10% above their pre-hurricane average. SSI is estimated
to fall, but the variable clearly exhibits a significant pre-trend. All of the increases appear to be
temporary: per capita UI is the only variable that's significantly higher ten years later and appears
to be coming back down to pre-hurricane levels.
Table 9 shows the corresponding mean shift and trend break tests. On average, per capita
unemployment benefits increase by 22%, equivalent to about $19 per person per year. Assuming a
3% discount rate, the present discounted value (PDV) of the unemployment payments is about $180
per capita. Per capita medical benefits increase by about 4.6% on average, but the dollar equivalent
of the increase is very small. The overall increase in per capita family assistance payments is only
marginally significant and the dollar equivalent of the increase is likewise small.
2.5.2 Heterogeneity of Effects by Wealth
In this section, I focus on the heterogeneity in the post-hurricane employment rate, per capita
earnings, population, and transfer payments. In Table 10, I show the results of the mean shift and
trend break tests by the quartile of median housing value. There are no significant differences in
population or employment rate changes. Per capita earnings increase on average in low housing
value counties and subsequently decrease (relative to counties in the two middle quartiles). The
reverse pattern holds in high housing values counties, so that ten years after the hurricane, per
capita earnings changes are not estimated to be significantly different between high and low housing
value counties.
Changes in per capita overall transfers from the government and per capita unemployment
insurance are also qualitatively different for bottom and top quartiles of housing value (relative to
counties in the two middle quartiles). Per capita transfers from the government are substantially
higher in low-value counties while in high-value counties they are substantially lower on average.
Per capita unemployment insurance increases by 0.21 log points more in low-value counties than
in medium-value counties and shows an upward trend while remaining unchanged in high-value
counties. These results highlight interesting qualitative differences between counties of different
housing values and suggest that government transfers may play a larger role in low housing value
counties in the aftermath of a hurricane. Appendix Table A5 shows the corresponding estimates for
high-income and low-income counties. The estimates generally follow the pattern in Table 10.
Overall, hurricanes appear to produce differences (some lasting and some temporary) in areas
that differ in incomes and housing values, but the mechanism for how and why this occurs cannot
be determined with the current data. The differential increase in per capita transfers reinforces the
idea that these may also play an important role in absorbing the impact of the shock. Because
heterogeneity in the post-hurricane economic dynamics should be an important factor for policy de-
sign, potential explanations such as differential credit constraints and moving costs deserve further
detailed study.
2.5.3 Robustness
In this section, I report the results of various checks to verify that the results in the previous
section are robust and to examine the variation in the magnitude of estimated effects. Overall, the
qualitative result of higher transfer payments with no corresponding change in other variables is
robust across different samples, and the magnitude of the estimated increase is relatively stable.
Joint tests of the lead hurricane indicators in Appendix Tables Al-A4 suggest that there are
pre-trends in some of the hurricane variables. One explanation for the significance of these lead
coefficients is that hurricane-prone areas have a different time trend. Combined with the fact
that outcomes are autocorrelated, this implies that leads of the hurricane variable are likely to be
significant spuriously, due to the omitted variable bias. Unfortunately, the paucity of hurricanes
does not allow me to estimate a county-specific trend and include year and county fixed effects at
the same time. In Appendix C, I use a Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate that the pre-trends
are not likely to affect the qualitative estimates in this case. In addition, the overall time trend is
estimated to be insignificant in all trend break tests except for per capita unemployment and SSI
payments and the fraction of population that is black (which are all estimated to be decreasing in
the hurricane counties).
In the first robustness test, I restrict the sample to only counties affected once by a hurricane
between 1980 and 1996 (in other words, only the treated group). Although the sample is smaller,
the basic results still hold. The estimated amount of extra government transfers is somewhat larger,
but comparable to the original estimates. The only substantial difference is that, in addition to the
mean increase, unemployment payments show an upward trend of about 2.7% per year. Per capita
UI payments are estimated to be 39% higher five years after the hurricane and 53% higher eleven
years after the hurricane.
Another robustness sample includes a control group that's constructed using only historic hur-
ricane data and propensity score matching (recall that the main control group was also matched
by 1970 covariates). The simple risk-based matching also yields results that are very similar to the
main sample and in some cases produces more precise estimates.
One other concern with the basic specification and sample is that there may be spatial effects.
In other words, a neighbor of a centrally affected county may also be affected. This could be
either due to unmeasured hurricane destruction, as discussed in Section 3, or because of spatial
economic spillovers. The spillovers can be positive or negative, so the sign of the bias created by
spatial effects is ambiguous. To see if spatial spillovers are a concern, I omit unaffected neighbors
of counties that experience hurricanes for eleven years after the hurricane. There is no significant
fall in construction employment but a 1.2% decline in the number of establishments. As before,
the average construction wage increases by an average of 8.5% following the hurricane but shows
no downward trend in this sample. This suggests that some of the hurricane county's construction
activity moves to the neighboring counties, implying that hurricanes may permanently affect the
business patterns in centrally affected and neighboring counties.
One other potential confounder is that those likely to receive government transfers may be
moving into the counties affected by hurricanes from nearby counties so that there is no aggregate
impact on transfers, only a compositional change. One way to test for this is to look at changes
in transfers on the state level. Unfortunately, the affected population represents 11% of the state
population on average. Thus, the power to detect an aggregate affect is low. Instead, I look at the
changes in transfers in counties whose center is within 50 miles from the center of the affected county
(including the affected county itself). This distance should be large enough to capture potential
compositional changes, but not so large that the power to detect a change in transfers is reduced.
The results are generally very similar. In the ten years following a hurricane, employment in the
50-mile radius is unaffected. Per capita transfers from the government increase by 2.2% on average
and show an increasing trend of 0.4% per year following the hurricane. Per capita unemployment
insurance payments increase by 26.6% on average and show an increasing trend of 4% per year.
The only substantive difference between this and the other samples is that per capita earnings are
estimated to decline by an extra 0.57% per year following the hurricane. Finally, including all the
counties in the hurricane region as controls also leads to similar results.
Adding state-by-year fixed effects to the basic specification generally makes the results insignifi-
cant. This is not surprising given the autocorrelation of the outcomes and relatively few counties in
the affected sample. In particular, transfers from businesses to individuals are no longer estimated
to be significantly higher. As these represent insurance payment, which should increase following a
hurricane, this suggests that including state-by-year fixed effects is overly conservative.
2.6 Interpretation and Discussion
The construction estimates show that hurricanes have non-monotonic medium-run effects on that
sector, with an initial increase in wages followed by a gradual return to pre-hurricane levels three
to eight years after the hurricane. At the same time, there is a fall in single family housing starts.
However, the effects on general economic variables, such as population, employment, and wages,
are insignificant. Although the US has a developed disaster response system, my estimates suggest
that traditional social safety nets, such as unemployment insurance, also play an important role
in post-disaster economics. The largest empirical effect of a hurricane is on non-disaster transfer
programs, the transfers from which increase substantially after a hurricane. For a county with the
average population of 78, 000, the estimated increase of $640 per capita in non-disaster government
transfers translates to a total of $50 million. This is much larger than the estimated disaster aid,
which contributes $356 per capita, and could have non-trivial fiscal implications in the future if
climate change intensifies the strength of hurricanes. Together, disaster and non-disaster transfers
represent a large fraction of the direct damages caused by the hurricane. These estimates also imply
that the fiscal impact of natural disasters is more than twice as large if non-disaster transfers are
also considered. Although in the simplest public finance framework transfers are welfare-neutral,
in practice the deadweight loss of taxation is estimated to be 12 - 30% of revenue (Ballard et al.,
1985; Feldstein, 1999). Assuming a 15% deadweight loss implies a real cost of $53 per capita per
hurricane for disaster transfers ($4.1 million for a county with a population of 78,000) and $96
($7.5 million) per capita per hurricane for non-disaster transfers. Taking the upper estimate of 30%
doubles these estimates. Moreover, the marginal deadweight loss of taxation, which is the relevant
cost if we're considering mitigating the effect of hurricanes, is thought to be much larger. Feldstein
(1999) estimates it to be $1 - $2 per dollar of revenue. Thus, this additional cost of hurricanes to
society is not trivial.
Of course, the estimate that non-disaster transfers are 1.5 -2 times larger than disaster transfers
does not imply that they are 1.5 - 2 times as important. The designs of the disaster and non-
disaster government programs suggest that they may be complementary. Social insurance programs
may fill an important gap left by current disaster policy and private insurance markets. Disaster
transfers target individuals immediately impacted by the disaster and provide funds to restore public
infrastructure. Disaster aid to individuals makes up only about 39% of total disaster aid; the rest is
allocated to activities such as debris cleanup and restoration of public buildings and roads (FEMA,
personal communication). Private insurance targets individuals who sustain disaster losses in the
form of property damage. Non-disaster social insurance programs, such as unemployment insurance,
are able to target individuals who are affected indirectly.
Although the US has a disaster-related unemployment insurance program (it is included in the
figure for disaster-related transfers), it provides benefits only to those who can show that they
lost their jobs directly as a result of the disaster. Individuals who lose their jobs as a result of
an economic downturn months to years later would be unable to claim these benefits. If there
are lasting economic effects (as seems to be the case with US hurricanes), people may be affected
months to years following the disaster. In that case, disaster aid and property insurance are not
helpful, but standard social safety net programs will be automatically triggered. The presence
of these programs can thus serve as insurance against delayed effects of natural disasters. As
discussed in the conceptual framework, non-disaster transfers may buffer the economic shock of
a hurricane and also explain why there are no large changes in population, employment or wages.
According to the World Labour Report 2000, seventy-five percent of the world's unemployed are not
receiving any benefit payments (International Labour Organization, 2000). In addition to making
individuals vulnerable to economic shocks, my analysis suggests that a lack of social safety nets also
has implications for the economic recovery of an area following a natural disaster.
One possible explanation for the increase in unemployment payments and overall government
transfers is changes in the demographic composition of an area. This change in the age composition
is inconsistent with the changes in non-disaster transfers. Total government transfers include social
security and disability payments. There is no a priori reason to think that a larger number of young
people and a decline in the number of elderly would increase the total transfers. Young people
are more likely to be unemployed than the elderly, but most of the people in the "under 20 years
old" category are unlikely to be receiving unemployment insurance payments. When I separate the
category "20 to 64 years old" into ten-year age categories, I find that there is no change in the
fraction or log of population that is between 20 and 29, 30 and 39, or 40 and 49 years old. There is
a slight increase in the fraction of population that is between 50 and 64, but it is not large enough
to explain the increases in transfers. This age group makes up about 14% of the total population.
To explain a non-trivial part of the increase in government transfers, each person in this age group
would have to be receiving an implausibly large amount of them.
This demographic change does raise concerns about other unobserved changes in the population.
However, to the extent that the changes in unobservable characteristics are correlated with the
changes in observable ones, this is not likely to be an issue. Disaggregated estimates indicate
that the compositional change is gradual, while the increases in the unemployment insurance and
overall transfers are immediate and non-monotonic. If the non-disaster transfers were driven by
demographic changes, the change in the age profile should correspond to the change in transfers.
As the two differ, it's likely that the demographic change is another effect of the hurricane that is
unrelated to the change in transfers.
One possible explanation for the demographic change is a change in the composition of job
opportunities that makes the county a relatively less attractive place to retire and a relatively more
attractive place to raise children. Another is different risk preferences across different ages combined
with updated beliefs following the hurricane. If the elderly are more risk averse, they will be more
reluctant to live in a hurricane-prone area. Population as a whole may not decrease if housing prices
adjust to compensate for the increase in the perceived risk of living in the county.
Whether the presence of unemployment insurance for those living in disaster areas is welfare-
improving on a national level is not straightforward. On one hand, the presence of insurance against
economic losses not covered by homeowner's and flood insurance is a benefit when individuals are
risk averse or credit constrained. Theoretically, they may allow credit constrained individuals to
avoid moving costs during rebuilding. However, disaster risk is not currently accounted for in
unemployment insurance premiums. This subsidizes business activity in disaster-prone areas, which
decreases social welfare. Thus, disaster and non-disaster transfers may be creating a moral hazard
problem. In addition, there are many other distortions in insurance and aid policy that discourage
insurance and encourage people to live in disaster-prone areas. This makes even a theoretical welfare
analysis of unemployment insurance difficult.
2.7 Conclusion
If current demographic and economic trends continue, damages from natural disasters will increase,
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP. In addition, climate change is projected to
increase the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events. Projections for future increases in
disaster damages due to climate change are highly uncertain but thought to be large. A country's
infrastructure and institutions have been identified as important determinants of the impact of
extreme weather events, both theoretically and empirically. Thus, informed policy has the potential
to reduce the damages caused by extreme weather and mitigate its economic impacts. However, the
economic impacts of extreme weather are understudied. Most of the literature to date has focused
on studying damages or very short-run impacts on isolated variables; a comprehensive picture of
post-disaster economic dynamics is lacking.
I estimate the medium-run economic effects of hurricanes on US counties, focusing on population,
employment, wages, and transfers to individuals. Population, the employment rate and wages are
largely unaffected in the ten years following the hurricane, while construction employment and new
housing starts decline substantially.
I find that hurricanes have large and persistent effects on non-disaster transfer payments. Real
transfers from traditional safety net programs over the eleven years following the hurricane (including
the year of the hurricane) are estimated to total $640 per capita, much larger than the disaster-
related transfers of $356 per capita. Insurance payments increase temporarily in the year of the
hurricane but add only an estimated $23 per capita in present discounted value.
Most of the transfers from traditional safety net programs are estimated to occur later than
government disaster transfers and insurance payments typically occur, suggesting that traditional
safety net programs are filling in a gap in public and private disaster insurance. Private insurance
in this case is best suited to targeting those who lose their homes, but traditional social insurance
may target those who are affected by the dynamic economic effects of the disaster.
Transfer programs designed for general economic downturns, such as unemployment insurance
and food stamps, can act as buffers against adverse economic impacts following destruction. First,
this has implications for the actual costs of a disaster: in addition to money spent on disaster
relief, extreme weather has fiscal effects on other government transfer programs. Second, ignoring
traditional transfer programs attributes too much of a developed economy's resilience to its wealth
or disaster response policies and not enough to general social policies.
My results also show gradual demographic changes in the affected county. The fraction of
the population under 20 increases while the fraction of the population 65 and older falls. These
changes could be caused by differential economic opportunities for different demographic groups
or by updated beliefs about risk and risk preferences that vary across groups. Finally, a county's
wealth and housing stock value also seems to matter for earnings and transfer trajectories. Whether
this is because of different decisions or constraints of individuals or because of differential hurricane
impacts is an area for future research.
My findings have several suggestive policy implications. First, policymakers should consider the
potential role of non-disaster programs in recovery. Second, they may want to incorporate disaster-
related unemployment risk into the design of social safety net programs to avoid moral hazard issues.
Third, as the fiscal costs of disasters are larger than previously thought, implementing mitigation
programs is correspondingly more beneficial. Admittedly, I cannot estimate what the effects of a
US hurricane would be without social insurance programs using the current data. Given that much
of the world's population does not have access to social or disaster insurance and is at an increasing
risk of natural disasters, the causal effect of social insurance on disaster impacts and whether it
creates moral hazard are two other areas that deserve further study. Estimating the impact of
federal disaster aid is another important area for future research.
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Appendix A. Distribution of Eye Diameters
Because eye diameters are related to the size of the affected area but the relevant data are not
systematically collected, I have to consider how not observing the diameter might impact estimates
of a hurricane's effect. The most comprehensive information on the characteristics of North Atlantic
storms come from air reconnaissance data analyzed by Weatherford and Gray (1988). About 15%
of cyclones in the data have eyes less than 18.6 miles in diameter, 25% have eyes 18.6 - 37.3 miles
in diameter (average is 27.3 miles), and 8% had larger eyes (the largest was 149 miles). Most (53%)
had no discernible eye and very few had eyes larger than 49.7 miles in diameter. Thus, nearly 70%
of all hurricane eyes appear to not be very large.
Appendix B. Cross- and Auto-correlation in Outcome Variables
In Appendix Tables A6-A8, I show some of the cross-correlation and autocorrelation coefficients of
the variables used in the analysis (in logs), taking out year and county fixed effects.
Table A6 shows that total unemployment payments are significantly and positively correlated
with total wages and employment, although the magnitudes are not large (8.6 and 6.3%, respec-
tively), while unemployment payments per capita are negatively correlated with these variables
(-23.1% and -32.9%, respectively). Earnings per capita are negatively correlated with income
maintenance payments (the magnitude is -6.4%) while total earnings are positively correlated
(21%). State and local tax receipts are highly positively correlated with both total earnings (82.3%)
and earnings per capita (58.8%).
Table A7 shows the correlation between the construction sector variables and other economic
outcomes. The number of construction firms, employees, wages, and payroll are heavily correlated
with overall earnings and earnings per capita and the magnitudes are large. A 10% increase in
earnings per capita is associated with a 7.3% increase in the number of construction firms, a 10.6%
increase in the number of construction employees, and 12.6% and 2.3% increases in total construction
payroll and wages, respectively.
Table A8 focuses on the autocorrelation between the outcome variables. The autocorrelation
coefficients are all significant at the 1% level and range from 0.095 for construction wages per worker
to 0.986 for overall business receipts. Total population and government transfers to individuals and
non-profits are also heavily correlated, while earnings per capita, business transfers to individuals,
and payroll wages per worker are among the least correlated (although the correlation coefficients
are still between 0.275 and 0.693). This also leads to an R-squared that is nearly equal to 1.
These cross- and auto-correlations present some challenges for the estimation. In particular, it
may be more difficult to estimate the effect of a hurricane in a given time period precisely. For
this reason, I rely on both joint and individual significance testing when interpreting the results.
Because I can identify the precise onset of a hurricane, I can still estimate its duration and net
impact fairly accurately.
Appendix C. Risk-related Trends, Autocorrelation and Lead Signif-
icance: a Monte Carlo Analysis
The F-tests of hurricane lead indicators indicate that they are significant for many economic out-
comes. In this section, I use a Monte Carlo simulation to show how this can arise when, in addition
to autocorrelation, there is an unobserved time trend that is correlated with hurricane risk and
discuss how this affects my estimates. Both heterogeneous time trends and autocorrelation appear
to be present in my sample.
I generate a sample of 1000 "counties" that are observed for 30 time periods. I randomly
assign 5% of the observations to experience an "event". In addition, each county is assigned an
unobserved risk variable which is correlated with the occurrence of the event. The outcome of
interest is determined as follows:
Outcomeet = !3Eventet + iyOutcomec,ti + Oy * Riske + Ect
Eventet is the event indicator for county c in year t. Riske is a uniform variable between zero
and one, multiplied by the mean of the event indicator for the county (this implies that Riske will
be correlated with Ec [Event]). I assume that B = 10, y = 0.9, and 0 = 0.001. EcY is standard
normal and is identically and independently distributed across counties and time periods.
The risk variable captures the possibility that time trends are related to a county's propensity
to be affected by hurricanes. This could be because the county is investing increasing amounts of
mitigation over time, insurance is becoming more widely available and adopted or because people
are slowly leaving the area as they realize the hazard they face. Alternatively, as the economy
becomes wealthier, people may disproportionately prefer to live in hurricane-prone places if there is
risk aversion or if wealthier people are more able to weather the shock of a hurricane. All of these
factors could produce unobserved heterogeneity in the time trend.
Following the generation of the Monte Carlo sample, I estimate two regression specifications
similar to those in the paper. One of them includes leads and the other considers lags only. These
are specified as follows:
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Outcomect = ( / 3 TEvente,t-T + /c + ac + Ect
T=0
{#23 6 6} are indicator variables for the "event" outside of the estimation window of inter-
est. Thus, this estimation is analogous to the estimation of the effect of hurricanes on the US,
with {#0} o being the estimated effect of the event 0-5 years after relative to the pre-event out-
come. Note that the estimated effect of the "event" in years other than 0 is entirely due to the
autocorrelation in the outcome variable and is also possibly affected by the unobserved time trend
heterogeneity.
Appendix Table A9 shows the theoretical and estimated effects of the event 0 - 5 time periods
after and 2 - 5 periods before its occurrence. Although the theoretical effects of lead variables are
zero when no time trends are present, separate and joint tests indicate that all leads negatively
affect the outcome. Including the lagged outcome variable does not change the significance of the
leads. The inclusion of leads also appears to bias the estimated effect of an event down.
Despite the presence of risk-related time trends, the estimated coefficients of lags appear to be
fairly close to the theoretical effect, although they are biased downwards. A priori, it is not clear
whether the inclusion of leads will decrease or increase the bias; this depends on whether the time
trend is positive or negative.
I do not include the lagged outcome variable in my analysis of hurricanes because the large num-
ber of fixed effects combined with high autocorrelation makes the estimation ill-behaved. County
and time fixed effects are likely to be more important to include. Moreover, I am interested in
the overall effects of hurricanes, including through autocorrelation. The lagged hurricane indicators
implicitly capture the autocorrelation and any non-standard dynamic that may occur following a
hurricane (for example, the non-monotonicity of the construction sector response).
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Table 2: Damages caused by major US hurricanes, 1980-1996
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Total per capita loss ($)
Displaced households
People requiring shelter
























































Source: HAZUS-MH simulation software published by FEMA. All monetary figures are in 2008
dollars.
























































































Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Damages and flood claims are in current dollars. Includes county and year fixed effects. Property damage data is from
SHELDUS. Flood insurance payments data is from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR). Time period is
1980-1996 for damages, 1983-1996 for flood claims.
'Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
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Assumes aid money is split evenly among all counties in sample
2 Assumes aid money is split in proportion to the population of counties in sample
Source: NOAA Best Tracks data, PERI disaster declarations. Standard errors in parentheses.
All amounts are in 2008 dollars.
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Population density (person/sq. mile)
Employment rate (fraction)
Net earnings per capita (log)
Per capita transfers from government
(log)
Per capita transfers from businesses
(log)
Per capita family assistance (log)
Per capita public medical benefits (log)
Per capita UI payments (log)
Per capita new single family housing (log)
Population (log)
Population density (person/sq. mile)
Employment rate (fraction)
Net earnings per capita (log)
Per capita transfers from government
(log)
Per capita transfers from businesses
(log)
Per capita family assistance (log)
Per capita public medical benefits (log)
Per capita unemployment insurance
payments (log)


























































































































'Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia
2Number may be smaller for some variables because of missing values.
Source: 1970 REIS, 1970 CBP and 1970 Census. Standard errors in parentheses. Monetary values are in
2008 dollars.
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Sample: counties in Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia. 95% confidence intervals shown. Standard errors clustered
by county. Controls include county, year, and coastal by year fixed effects.
Table 6: Mean shift and trend break tests for Figure 2
Construction
employment (log)































(0.0048) (0.0074)Mean of dep. var. 6.90 4.33 10.16 
-5.40
Observations 4,744 4,744 6,166 6,166 4,744 4,744 6,630 6,630
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.87 0.87 0.63 0.63
Estimated 5-year -0.1916 -0.0611 0.0158 -0.0856
change (0.0917)** (0.0417) (0.0441) (0.0697)
Estimated 11-year -0.2934 -0.1276 -0.0381 -0.0949
change (0.1483)** (0.0710)* (0.0672) (0.1152)
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Includes indicators and time trends for hurricane events outside of the 21 year window of interest, year, county, and
year-by-coastal fixed effects.
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Sample: counties in Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia. 95% confidence intervals shown. Standard errors clusteredby county. Controls include county, year, and coastal by year fixed effects.
(0
Table 7: Mean shift and trend break tests for Figure 3
Fraction black Fraction 20 and
residents Fraction 65 and older younger Population (log)
Post hurricane 0.0007 0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0040 0.0068(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0006)* (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0048) (0.0046)
Post hurricane -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0028time trend (0.0003) (0.0002)** (0.0002)* (0.0016)*
Overall time trend -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0017
(0.0003)** (0.0003)** (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Mean of dep. var. 0.28 0.12 0.31 10.56
Observations 6,860 6,860 6,899 6,899 6,899 6,899 6,899 6,899
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.99 0.99
Estimated 5-year 0.0000 -0.0034 0.0019 0.0209
change (0.0016) (0.0013)*** (0.0011)* (0.0096)**
Estimated 11- -0.0006 -0.0058 0.0036 0.0349
yearchange (0.0027) (0.0023)** (0.0020)* (0.0167)**
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Includes indicators and time trends for hurricane events outside of the 21 year window of interest, year,
county, and year-by-coastal fixed effects.
Figure 4. The effect of a hurricane on
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Sample: counties in Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia. 95% confidence intervals shown. Standard errors clustered
by county. Controls include county, year, and coastal by year fixed effects.
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Table 8: Mean shift and trend break tests for Figure 4
Employment rate
(fraction)




Overall time trend -0.0007 -0.0010
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2.43 2.65 91.55 65.68
6,706 6,706 6,860 6,860





Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 1%.
Includes indicators and time trends for hurricane events outside of the 21 year window of interest, year, county, and
year-by-coastal fixed effects.
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Sample: counties in Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Texas, and Virginia. 95% confidence intervals shown. Standard errors clustered
by county. Controls include county, year, and coastal by year fixed effects.















































change (levels) 2.01E-03 2.66E-03 4.70E-02 4.61E-02 1.60E-03 1.69E-03 19.17 20.83
Observations 6,709 6,709 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,821 6,821
R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.97 0.97 0.86 0.86 0.65 0.65
Estimated 5-year 0.1002 0.0418 0.0145 0.3185
change (0.0593)- (0.0200)- (0.0245) (0.0877)...
Estimated 11-year 0.1545 0.0374 0.0175 0.4025
change (0.1052) (0.0355) (0.0428) (0.1342)...
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; **significant at 1 %.
Includes indicators and time trends for hurricane events outside of the 21 year window of interest, year, county, and year-
by-coastal fixed effects.
Table 10: Post-hurricane mean shift and trend breaks by 1970 median housing value
Mean change in bottom
quartile
Mean change in top quartile
Trend change in bottom
quartile



















Difference in means/l -
-0.0245 0.0074year changes (bottom - top)






























































Observations 6,899 6,899 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,821 6,821
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.97 0.97 0.66 0.66
Bold denotes p-values less than 0.05. Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Includes year, county,
year-by-coastal fixed effects, as well as quartile-specific trends.
0.006 0.012 0.066 0.008
Appendix Tables
T = - 9 or - 10
T = - 7 or - 8
T = - 5 or - 6
T = - 3 or -4
T = 0
T = 1 or2
T = 3 or 4
T = 5 or 6
T = 7 or 8
T = 9 or 10
Mean of dep. var.
Observations
R-squared
p-value of all leads
F-test 0.279 0.655
p-value of all lags
F-test 0.000 0.000
p-value of T=0 to
T=4 lags F-test 0.001 0.000
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. *
year, county, and year-by-coastal fixed effects.






















































































Table A2: The effect of a hurricane on population and demographics
T = - 9 or - 10
T = - 7 or - 8
T = - 5 or - 6





T = 7 or 8














































Mean of dep. var. 0.285 0.123
Observations 6,860 6,899
R-squared 0.98 0.92
p-value of all leads
F-test 0.066 0.095
p-value of all lags
F-test 0.091 0.378
p-value of T=0 to
T=4 lags F-test 0.125 0.199
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant























































at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Table A3: The effect of a hurricane on employment, wages, and transfers
Per capita
Per capita transfer transfer from
Employment from government businesses Per capita net
rate (fraction) (logs) (logs) earnings (log)
T = - 9 or - 10 0.005 0.014 0.009 -0.019
(0.009) (0.013) (0.003)** (0.018)
T = - 7 or - 8 0.005 0.011 0.001 -0.027
(0.008) (0.011) (0.004) (0.015)*
T = - 5 or - 6 -0.003 0.016 0.006 -0.036
(0.004) (0.009)* (0.003) (0.011)***
T = - 3 or -4 -0.004 0.008 0.003 -0.025
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)***
T= 0 0.000 0.012 0.116 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)*** (0.026)*** (0.007)
T = 1 or2 -0.002 0.018 0.013 -0.003
(0.004) (0.007)** (0.003)*** (0.011)
T = 3 or 4 -0.005 0.025 0.023 -0.008
(0.006) (0.008)*** (0.011)* (0.014)
T = 5 or 6 -0.007 0.018 0.004 -0.010
(0.006) (0.010)* (0.004) (0.015)
T = 7 or 8 -0.007 0.005 0.035 -0.007
(0.007) (0.013) (0.027) (0.017)
T = 9 or 10 -0.004 0.007 0.100 0.007
(0.008) (0.015) (0.046)** (0.018)
Mean of dep. var. 0.585 8.088 4.373 9.605
Observations 6,860 6,860 6,706 6,860
R-squared 0.87 0.96 0.87 0.90
p-value of all leads
F-test 0.456 0.340 0.055 0.020
p-value of all lags
F-test 0.757 0.003 0.000 0.107
p-value of T=0 to
T=4 lags F-test 0.491 0.011 0.001 0.719
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Includes year, county, and year-by-coastal fixed effects.
Table A4: The effect of a hurricane on various government transfers
Per capita public Per capita
Per capita family medical benefits Per capita SSI unemployment
assistance (logs) (log) benefits (log) insurance (log)
T = - 9 or - 10 0.068 0.043 0.059 0.085
(0.054) (0.022)* (0.026)** (0.066)
T = - 7 or - 8 -0.011 0.019 0.033 0.152
(0.048) (0.019) (0.023) (0.061)**
T = - 5 or - 6 -0.039 0.024 0.019 0.089
(0.037) (0.014) (0.016) (0.054)
T = - 3 or - 4 0.020 0.023 -0.003 0.008
(0.022) (0.008)*** (0.010) (0.035)
T = 0 -0.029 0.024 -0.009 0.142
(0.014)** (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.039)***
T = 1 or 2 0.015 0.043 -0.017 0.204
(0.021) (0.013)*** (0.011) (0.044)***
T = 3 or 4 0.103 0.046 -0.030 0.268
(0.033)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)* (0.050)***
T = 5 or 6 0.070 0.026 -0.039 0.301
(0.039)* (0.017) (0.020)* (0.054)***
T = 7 or 8 0.103 0.000 -0.049 0.239
(0.049)** (0.021) (0.026)* (0.056)***
T = 9 or 10 0.037 0.011 -0.065 0.187
(0.053) (0.024) (0.029)** (0.063)***
Mean of dep. var. -2.873 -0.023 -1.926 4.367
Observations 6,709 6,860 6,860 6,821
R-squared 0.82 0.97 0.86 0.65
p-value of all leads
F-test 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.004
p-value of all lags
F-test 0.000 0.000 0.278 0.000
p-value of T=0 to
T=4 lags F-test 0.000 0.005 0.113 0.000
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Includes year, county, and year-by-coastal fixed effects.
Table A5: Post-hurricane mean shift and trend breaks by county income
Mean change in bottom
quartile
Mean change in top
quartile
Trend change in bottom
quartile















Estimated 11-year change 0.0137
in top quartile (0.0384)
Difference in means/11-

































































0.482 0.814 0.044 0.989 0.734 0.868 0.001 0.092 0.253 0.017
6,899 6,899 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,860 6,821 6,821
0.99 0.99 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.97 0.97 0.66 0.66
Bold denotes p-values less than 0.05. Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Includes year, county,
year-by-coastal fixed effects, as well as quartile-specific trends.
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maintenance (log) (0.008)*** (0.022)***
Observations 33,844 34,767 33,822 34,745 36,809 36,809 12,168
R-sauared 0.91 0.91 0.62 0.62 0.85 0.98 0.97
12,168
0.96
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Includes county and year fixed effects.
Table A7: the co-movement of the local construction sector with earnings
Total establishments Total employment
(log) (log) Total pay (log) Per worker pay (log)
Net earnings per 0.733 1.058 1.259 0.229
capita (log) (0.056)*** (0.078)*** (0.089)*** (0.026)***
0.899 0.961 1.137 0.182
Net earnings (log) (0.027)*** (0.036)*** (0.042)*** (0.013)***
Observations 34,352 34,352 30,872 30,872 31,751 31,751 29,743 29,743
R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.78 0.78
Standard errors (clustered by county) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Includes county and year fixed effects.




population Gov't --> ind Business --> maintenance Earnings per
(log) transfers ind transfers (log) capita (log)
0.984 0.966 0.396 0.892 0.693
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.029)*** (0.005)*** (0.021)***
36,791 35,834 32,414 35,865 35,870
1.00 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.92
Panel B: producer-side
Construction Total Construction Total Construction
















Total pay per worker
(log) pay (log)
Lagged vaiablIe 0.785 0.895 0.858 0.957 0.820 0.896 0.095 0.275
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)*** (0.023)***
Observations 30,730 34,844 35,233 36,002 31,630 35,828 29,871 34,799
R-squared 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.77 0.91








Table A9: Monte Carlo simulation, heterogeneous trends with autocorrelation
Time relative to Theoretical Estimation without including Estimation including lagged
























































































































Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Includes fixed effects for
county and dummies for "event more than 5 years ago" and "event more than 5 years in the future".
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Chapter 3
Selection in Area Yield Crop Insurance
3.1 Introduction
Despite a long-run decrease in developed countries' vulnerability to weather shocks, agriculture
worldwide remains susceptible to weather fluctuations. According to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events and change their spatial distribution (Meehl et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2007).
This is estimated to be costly to the agricultural sector (Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007). Yield
variability and the variance of food prices are likely to increase, at least in the short run. A
functioning insurance market may be key to keeping the agricultural sector stable, especially in
developing countries.
A number of developed and developing countries have crop insurance markets; most of these are
public or subsidized. A private market in crop insurance has been difficult to achieve. Standard
explanations for this include moral hazard and adverse selection, coupled with large monitoring
costs. In addition, unlike other insurance markets, such as health or auto, there is greater potential
for sudden aggregate shocks. The difficulty in establishing a private market, the potential for aggre-
gate shocks, and impending climate change warrant devoting more attention to the crop insurance
market.
In this paper, I examine the US insurance market for two common crops: corn and soybeans.
I discuss the general structure of available insurance plans. I note the moral hazard and adverse
selection concerns in crop insurance, how the US crop insurance market design addresses them, and
which features of insurance plans leave them susceptible to adverse selection and moral hazard.
Despite the attempts of market designers to minimize moral hazard and adverse selection, these
plans remain susceptible to strategic behavior.
I then test for a particular form of adverse selection into area yield insurance, where indemnity
payments to farmers are based on the average yield in the county and not on individual yields.
These plans are also known as "group insurance" plans. Although the group yield plans are not
very popular, they provide the cleanest test of adverse selection in this market. Moreover, because
monitoring costs and moral hazard concerns are low in these plans, group yield or weather-based
insurance is thought to be the most efficient way to provide crop insurance in many developing
countries. Thus, testing for adverse selection in this context is relevant to a wide range of markets.
Similar to Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), I use the presence
of information that affects outcomes but is not used in pricing to test for the presence of adverse
selection. Specifically, because yields are autocorrelated but prices don't account sufficiently for
recent yield shocks, recent yields are informative about future yields and should affect farmers'
insurance decisions. Thus, the first test consists of checking whether last year's yield (which is
predictive of the current yield but empirically does not affect the price) affects the total demand
for group insurance.
The first test is "structural" in that it assumes that the mechanism through which farmers
adversely select is last year's yield. I also perform a reduced-form test of adverse selection that does
not require knowing the selection mechanism. In addition to last year's yields, farmers or insurers
may have other information about future yields that is not reflected in prices. Even though this
information may not be observable to the econometrician, its presence should lead to a correlation
between contemporaneous yields and takeup, after controlling for other factors. Three features of
group insurance make it possible to attribute any residual correlation between the current yield and
takeup to selection. First, the pricing formula for group insurance plans is known. Second, because
group insurance is typically offered in counties that have many farmers, there is no potential for
moral hazard. Finally, the insurance decision is made before crops are planted (and thus before
yields are known). Thus, the reduced-form test for selection consists of checking whether the number
of group insurance policies is significantly correlated with the current yield. The validity of this test
relies only on the fact that the presence of a selection mechanism described above should lead to a
significant correlation between contemporaneous yields and takeup.
I find no evidence that last year's yields influence takeup of group insurance plans, although
the estimates are not very precise. However, the second (reduced-form) test indicates that group
insurance takeup is higher when average current yields in the county are higher. This suggests
that the net selection into area yield plans favors providers, not buyers of insurance. Although this
is surprising, it is consistent with earlier findings that insurance companies may obtain significant
excess rents through reinsurance decisions based on weather, a form of supply-side adverse selection
(Ker and McGowan, 2000).
It may be unlikely that providers have more information than individuals in many other insurance
markets. However, it is plausible in the market for area yield insurance. Providers may observe
detailed yield information for many farmers in the county (through information provided to buy
individual insurance plans, which are very popular) and thus be able to form better aggregate yield
forecasts than individual farmers. Because providers cannot compete on prices by law, the selection
may be working through insurance agents convincing farmers to choose one plan over another or
through targeting particular counties in years when yields are likely to be high.
Finally, I find that in some specifications current and last year's yields are predictive of the
total number of insurance policies in the county (including individual plans). This suggests that
the desirability of other plans may be changing with yields as well, affecting other options in the
farmers' choice set. However, because prices in non-group plans are determined using individual
yields, which I do not observe, I cannot determine whether the relationship between aggregate
takeup of insurance and yields is due to selection or changes in prices.
I contribute to two strands of literature. First, I perform the first test of adverse selection
into area yield insurance plans. Although there have been numerous studies of moral hazard and
adverse selection in crop insurance, these have typically examined the correlation between farmer
characteristics and crop insurance decisions (e.g., Makki and Somwaru, 2001) or focused on a narrow
geographical area (Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Coble et al., 1997;
Roberts et al., 2006). Several program-wide tests have been performed (e.g., Walters et al., 2007),
but to my knowledge, this is the first test to use unpriced public information as the cause of adverse
selection.
Second, I contribute to the body of literature testing for moral hazard and adverse selection
in various insurance markets. These include health insurance (e.g., Altman et al., 1998; Cutler
and Reber, 1998; Simon, 2005; Einav et al, 2011; Handel, 2011), long-term care insurance (e.g.,
Sloan and Norton, 1997; Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Brown and Finkelstein, 2007), annuities
(Finkelstein and Poterba, 2002 and 20041; Fong, 2002; McCarthy and Mitchell, 2010), nursing home
use (Gruber and Grabowski, 2007), auto insurance (Dionne et al., 2004), and credit cards (Agarwal
et al., 2010). For a broader overview of the evidence for adverse selection in various insurance
markets, see Cohen and Siegelman (2010). Complementary studies across different markets help
distinguish features common to all insurance markets from idiosyncratic ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the US crop
insurance market. Section 3 develops a model of crop insurance choice within the existing market
structure and discusses how adverse selection and moral hazard could arise. In Section 4, I discuss
the empirical framework used to test for selection and moral hazard. Section 5 presents the results,
and Section 6 concludes.
3.2 The US Crop Insurance Market
Crop insurance plans in the US differ in the metric that determines payments and the level of the
deductible, called the "coverage level".' Payments can be determined by (a) individual yield, (b)
individual revenue, (c) mean county yield or (d) mean county revenue. Farmers cannot take out
multiple insurance plans for the same plot. Within these plan types, farmers can choose from several
'For a more comprehensive overview of the US crop insurance market, see Babcock (2011).
coverage levels ranging from 50% to 90%.2 The coverage level specifies the amount by which yield
or revenue has to fall (relative to a baseline) before any payment is made. If a farmer chooses a
75% coverage level, for example, he does not receive payments until his yield, revenue, the county
yield or the county revenue (depending on the type of plan) falls to more than 25% below the
established baseline. The plan type and coverage level largely describe the space of all insurance
plans available to farmers. 3 In this section, I describe the individual yield and county yield plans.
Individual revenue and county revenue plans are discussed briefly in Appendix A.
To reduce the amount of moral hazard and adverse selection, farmers are required to initiate the
purchase of insurance by a certain date, called the "sales closing date". This date varies by county,
crop, and year and precedes the earliest allowed planting date. In some circumstances, a farmer
may purchase insurance after the sales closing date, but these circumstances are limited. 4 In all
cases, the insurance decision is made months before yields for that year are realized.
Because farmer productivity varies, individual baseline yields are necessary for individual-level
plans to correctly determine the basis on which payment should be made. The baseline yield for an
individual yield plan is established by averaging a farmer's historic certified yields (4 consecutive
years is the minimum and 10 years is the maximum). Once 10 years of continuous yield history is
available, the baseline yield becomes a 10-year moving average, updated every year. If less than 4
years of continuous yield history is available, average county yields are used in place of an individual
yield until the farmer builds up an adequate yield history. If county yields are used to calculate
the baseline yield, they are discounted by 15 - 35%, depending on how many years of actual yield
history are available.
Per-acre payments under the individual yield plan (called Actual Production History or APH)
are determined by the following formula:
PayAPHit = max(0, [Yield guaranteeit - Yieldit] x price election) (3.1)
10
Yield guaranteeit = Xi* Y Yield;,t_,
S--1
where i indexes the farmer, t indexes the year, and Xi is the chosen coverage level. For individual
yield plans, it ranges from 50% to 85%, in 5 percentage point increments. Price election is the
payment per unit of yield shortfall, chosen by the farmer from a range set by the Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) or the Risk Management Agency (RMA). For example, a corn farmer
with a yield guarantee of 148 bushels per acre, a 75% coverage level, and a $1.50 price election will
get paid $1.5 for every unit shortfall in yield below 111 bushels per acre.
2Not all coverage levels are available for all plan types and in all counties
3Farmers also have some choices within a plan-coverage-level combination, such as how to combine different plots
and how much to get paid in the case of a shortfall. These are briefly discussed below.
4 One example is where the farmer first failed to plant a different crop.
The group yield plan, also known as county yield or area yield plan, is based on the deviation of
current county-level yields from their historic average. Because it is not based on individual yields,
individual yield histories are not necessary to sign up for it. Baseline county yields are based on
at least 30 years of yield history, not 10, and are trend-adjusted to reflect long-run productivity
changes. 5 The payment formula is similar to the individual yield plan with the exception that the
yield guarantee and actual yield are based on county, not individual, yields. Per-acre payments in
the group yield plan (Group Risk Plan or GRP) are determined as follows:
Pay _GRPit = max (0, [Yield guaranteeie, Yieldet] x price electioni) (3.2)
1 30 -- - ,
Yield guaranteeict = Xi * EYielde,t
S=1
Yielde,t_, is the de-trended average county yield. Payments are made if county yields fall far
enough below the yield guarantee. To ensure that farmers aren't simply "gambling" on yields,
farmers have to plant the relevant crop in order to participate in the group yield plan.
Plans similar to GRP have been advocated in developing nations because the enforcement costs
are much lower and the risk of moral hazard is completely eliminated, as long as the covered area is
large enough so that no farmer is able to affect the average county yields on his own. One drawback
of these plans is that they may not provide as much protection as plans based on individual yields.
Another is that they may lead to some inefficient behavior, such as a farmer planting a crop in
inappropriate conditions because planting is a requirement for participation. Finally, as I discuss
below, they may leave open opportunities for adverse selection.
3.3 Conceptual Framework
I now outline a simple discrete choice model for crop insurance and describe the potential for moral
hazard and adverse selection given the market structure explained in the previous section. For ease
of exposition, I assume risk neutrality; adding risk aversion does not change the fundamental points
below.
At time t - 1, the expected utility of farmer i from having insurance plan j at time t can be
written as:
uij,t-1 = #Et_1 [Indemijt) - -Pju + 'iP + 6 ijt
Et_ 1 [Indemijt] is the expectation of the indemnity payment in plan j at time t, formed at t - 1
5Data on yield histories used to establish county yields are provided by the National Agricultural Statistics Service
(NASS).
(when the insurance decision is made). Because indemnity payments in individual revenue and
individual yield plans depend on the individual yield history, the expected indemnity payment can
be farmer-specific. P 1 t is the time t price of plan j in county 1, the location of the farmer. 4j is an
unobservable (to the econometrician) fixed plan characteristic. The expected utility of the outside
option (not having insurance) is normalized to 0 (uj,t-1 = 0). I abstract from some within-plan
choices of how to combine insurable units and which price election to choose. To the extent that the
optimal choice of these options within a plan is unaffected by changes in the expected indemnity
payment or price, the additional options can be thought of as a part of the fixed plan characteristic.
If Eijt are iid extreme value, the probability of an individual choosing plan j at time t - 1 is:
Prt = exp (#Et_1  [Indemijt] - yPjit + V/j)
Zk exp (/Et_1 [Indemikt] - 1Pkit + p)k)
The expression for Et-1 [Indemijt] varies by plan. For individual yield plans, it is:
Et_ 1 [Indemigt| = (1 - 0) CjjEt_1 [XjYieldi,t_1 - Yieldjt|XjYieldj,ti - Yieldit < 0]
where Yieldi,t_1 is the baseline yield, established based on the available yield history and Yieldit
is the actual yield at time t. 0 is the probability that XjYieldj,t_1 - Yieldit is greater than 0 (i.e.,
that the indemnity payment is 0). Cjj is the price election (how much the farmer receives for every
unit of yield shortfall) chosen by the farmer. A higher price election will also increase the price of
the plan. Xj is the coverage level, expressed as a fraction between 0.5 and 1; the yield has to be
lower than 1 - Xj of the baseline yield before a farmer receives any payment.
For group yield plans, the expected indemnity payment is:
E [Indemijt] = (1 - 0) CjtEt_1 (XjYieldi,t_1 - Yieldit|XjYieldi,t- 1 - Yieldit < 0)
This expression is similar to the individual yield plans, except that the yields are now indexed
by 1, the county that individual i is located in. Thus, indemnity expectations from a group yield
plan do not vary by individual. The expected indemnity expressions for individual revenue and
county revenue plans are similar, except that yields are replaced by revenues.
The design of the individual insurance plans appears to lend itself to moral hazard. After taking
out insurance, farmers may reduce the use of costly inputs, such as fertilizer. Alternatively, they
may put in less effort during harvest time. However, because baseline yields are calculated using
a 10-year running average, the incentive for yield-reducing moral hazard is attenuated. Although
lower-than-baseline yields one year will increase insurance payments, they will also decrease the
baseline yield in the following year. The extent to which moral hazard is a problem in this case
depends on the farmer's discount rate and expectations about keeping the farm and the individual
insurance plan.
However, the use of the 10-year running average does create incentives for adverse selection.
Because a 10-year average is unlikely to reflect the true average yield, farmers who have worse-than-
average yield histories have an increased incentive to forego individual insurance until their yield
histories improve. Similarly, farmers who experienced better-than-average yields in the past 10 years
have an increased incentive to take out insurance in the following year. In other words, if Yieldt-i
is substantially below (above) the long-run yield average (assumed to be known to the farmer,
but unobservable to the insurer), the farmer has an incentive to decrease (increase) his insurance
coverage. Moreover, the mean is only one characteristic of yield distributions; farmers whose yield
distributions differ from those used in actuarial calculations may also be able to adversely select
into crop insurance plans, even if their mean yield is perfectly measured.
There is no moral hazard in the group yield (GRP) and group revenue (GRIP) plans unless
a farmer is "large" enough to substantially affect group yields. There remains the potential for
adverse selection based on private information about likely group yields or on public information
that isn't priced into the insurance plan (e.g., the forecasted weather conditions). Farmers whose
yields generally track group yields have a greater incentive to sign up. However, unless their farms
are large enough to affect group yields, expected GRP and GRIP payments are not affected by who
signs up for these plans.
Because there is uncertainty in the utility function above, informational asymmetries can arise
in this market. This can affect plan choice in at least two ways. First, farmers may have private in-
formation about their own future yield shocks (Et_1 [Yieldit]) based on evolving field characteristics
or some other idiosyncratic component. Second, as I show later, because yields are autocorrelated
across years, farmers may have information about expected yields that is public but not used in
pricing the plans. This may lead to adverse selection and undermine the functioning of the market.
In the next two sections, I outline the estimation procedure and present the estimates of this type
of adverse selection.
3.4 Empirical Framework
Ideally, one would observe individual farmers' yield histories and test for adverse selection across all
plans. However, the available data provide only plan-by-coverage-level summaries, making a clean
test of selection in individual insurance plans infeasible. Therefore, I focus on group yield insurance
plans (GRP), where all the relevant pricing information is observable. In addition, group plans do
not create the risk of moral hazard, making this a pure test of adverse selection. I focus on corn
and soybeans because these are the most commonly grown crops and thus have the largest number
of relevant observations. I perform the analysis separately for each crop.
To test for the presence of adverse selection, I follow Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). Specifi-
cally, I estimate the following equations :
Log(Yieldit) = /1Log(Yieldi,t-1) + / 2Log(Et_1 [Yieldit]) + at + ai + 6 tt (3.3)
Policiesit = -1iLog(Yieldi,t-1) + y2Log(Et_1 [Yieldit]) + at + ai + Eit (3.4)
where I is the county and t is the year. Et_1 [Yieldit] is the expected corn or soybean yield in county
I and year t, as reported by the Risk Management Agency (RMA). 6 Yieldi,ti is the yield in the
previous year, also reported by RMA. Policiesit is the number of corn GRP policies held. at and
al are year and county fixed effects, respectively. The specification for equation (3.3) is OLS, while
the specification for equation (3.4) is negative binomial. Because there are relatively few states
in the sample, standard errors are clustered by state-year in this and all following specifications.
Clustering by county generally decreases the standard errors.
Equation (3.3) tests whether last year's yield is predictive of current yield, controlling for the
expected yield (which is used to set the price of the insurance policies). Although last year's yield is
used in computing the expected yield for group insurance plans as part of 30 or more years of yield
data, it may have an independent predictive value if there is significant autocorrelation in yields. 7 If
#1 is significantly different from 0, then there is potential for adverse selection into the GRP plans.
Equation (3.4) tests for the presence of such adverse selection. In particular, I estimate whether
last year's yield affects the number of policies chosen, conditional on the expected yield. The
coefficient of interest is thus y1. Depending on the relationship between current and last year's
yield, it may be positive or negative. All else equal, farmers have an incentive to take out insurance
if they know that yields will be lower than expected by the insurance company. Thus, if #1 is
positive (negative), -yi should be negative (positive) when adverse selection is present.
There is another test of selection that can be performed in this setting because of the specific
features of group insurance plans. First, there is no moral hazard in GRP plans because they are
based on the average county yield and are only available in counties with many farms. Second, the
insurance choice in a given year is made months before yields in that year are realized. Finally, as
I show in Appendix B, contemporaneous yields and prices are not correlated.
Suppose there is some information accessible to farmers (e.g., weather or changes in soil quality)
that is not reflected in the price but is predictive of yield in the upcoming season. If farmers
act on this information, there should be a significant relationship between current yields and the
number of policies, even though current yields are not known when the insurance decisions are
made. Therefore, to perform this reduced-form test, I estimate the relationship between the current
yield and the number of GRP policies, controlling for the expected yield:
Policiesit = O1Log(Yieldjt) + 02Log(Et-_ [Yieldit]) + at + a, + Eit (3.5)
Instead of looking at selection on past observable information, this specification tests for selec-
tion on future yield realizations, controlling for the expected yield. Because farmers must purchase
6Available on http://www.rma.usda.gov/data/grpfinal/
7The RMA calculation of the expected yield does not allow for possible autocorrelation.
insurance long before the current yield is known, 01 implicitly captures the effect of other (un-
priced) information that farmers may have about yield realizations without having to measure this
information explicitly.
Finally, I test that prices (as reported in RMA actuarial documents) are not affected directly
by last year's or current yield:
Log (Pgit) =/1Log(Yieldi,t_1 ) + 2 Log(Et_ [Yieldit]) + ag t + agi + 6 git (3.6)
Log (Pgit) = S1Log(Yieldit) + 62Log(Et-I [Yieldit]) + agt + agi + Egit (3.7)
g = coverage level; t = year; 1 = location (county)
I perform this test at a more disaggregated level than the adverse selection test. If the relative
proportion of people in each coverage level changes because of adverse selection, the average price
across coverage levels might be statistically but not causally related to last year's yields. I use the
unsubsidized prices set by the insurance providers. Because premium subsidy rates vary only across
years and not across counties, this does not affect the results. The results of this regression are
shown in Tables Al and A2 and confirm the hypothesis that last year's and current yields do not
affect prices. [CHECK] The pricing and expected yield procedure used by the RMA is similar to
the procedure described in Skees, Black, and Barnett (1997). Note that they highlight the tradeoff
of more actuarily fair v. implementable prices. Moreover, Harri et al. (2011) note that the current
pricing algorithm does not account for heteroskedasticity in yields observed in some US counties.
I use crop insurance data from 1995-2009, published by the Risk Management Agency (RMA).8
The data are annual and broken down by county, crop, insurance plan type, and coverage level.
They contain information about the number of acres insured, total liabilities, indemnity payments,
premiums, and premium subsidies. These data include the premium and subsidy rate for each plan,
crop, and county over time.9
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis, including yields,
number of group insurance policies, and the total number of insurance policies. Columns 1 and 2
show the mean and standard deviations for corn and soybeans, respectively. The average number of
insurance policies is similar for corn (169 policies) and soybeans (179 policies). Group Risk Plans
(GRP) are available in 1,076 counties for corn and 961 counties for soybeans at least once during
the time period of interest. GRP plans represent, on average, about 2-3 percent of all insurance
policies. Thus, they are fairly unpopular. A likely explanation for this is that individual plans offer




Before presenting the formal regression results, I illustrate the raw relationships between actual,
expected, and last year's yields. Later, I re-examine this relationship taking fixed effects into
account. Figure 1 shows the relationships between actual and expected yields for corn and soybeans.
Although there is a substantial amount of variance, the two are strongly and positively related for
both crops. However, a fitted quadratic relationship lies above the 45 degree line for corn, indicating
that expected yields are generally below actual yields. For soybeans, the fitted line is somewhat
flatter than the 45 degree line, but does cross it. Overall, the expected yield is most biased at high
and low yields, but the magnitude does not appear to be large.
Figure 2 shows the relationships between actual yield and last year's yield for the two crops.
Again, the two are strongly and positively related. The plots for soybeans and corn look very
similar. A quadratic fit line indicates that low (high) yields last year are indicative of higher (lower)
yields this year. This is true for both crops and suggests that there is some mean reversion in yields.
If this is not accounted for in the price, there is potential for exploiting this information.
Table 2 shows the relationship between last year's yield and current yield for each crop, control-
ling for expected yield, county fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns 1 and 2 have the log of
the current yield as the dependent variable, while Columns 3 and 4 have the level of the current
yield as the dependent variable. In Columns 2 and 4, I restrict the sample to counties in which GRP
policies are ever taken up. The results are similar in both samples. Panel A shows these results for
corn. There is no level-level relationship between this year's and last year's yield and a very weak
one between the levels of this year's yield and expected yield. For soybeans (Panel B), a one unit
increase in yields in a given year is associated with a 0.08-0.09 unit decrease in yields the next year,
and this relationship is statistically significant. The relationship between logs of yield and lagged
yield is strong and significant for both crops, however.
According to Columns 1 and 2, a 1% increase in corn yields is associated with a 0.09 - 0.12%
decrease in yields in the following year, holding expected yield constant. Thus, yields appear to
exhibit some mean reversion. This process is not necessarily random: the lower yields following
higher yields may be due to patterns of nutrient depletion in the soil or of crop rotation. The
expected yield is also negatively correlated with the actual yield: a 1% increase in the expected
yield is associated with a 0.32 - 0.38% reduction in the actual yield. This is conditional on county
and year fixed effects, as well as last year's yield; regressing current corn yield on the expected yield
with no controls results in a partial correlation coefficient of 0.97 in levels and 0.53 in logs. The
results for soybeans are very similar.
Overall, current yield is predictive of future yield and, if not taken into account in prices, may
result in adverse selection. If last year's yield was average, the current yield is expected to be lower
than average. Holding price and expected yields constant, this should increase the demand for
GRP insurance because the likelihood of a payout is higher. Ceteris paribus, if farmers have private
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or unpriced information that this year's yield will be low (high), they should increase (decrease)
their demand for insurance. Thus, the relationship between the number of GRP policies and the
current yield should be negative. Because last year's and current yields are negatively correlated,
the relationship between the number of GRP policies and last year's yield should be positive.
Table 3 shows the relationship between (a) log of last year's yield and the number of GRP
policies and (b) log of this year's yield and the number of GRP policies, controlling for the log of
expected yield, county fixed effects and time fixed effects. The regression specification is a negative
binomial. There is no significant relationship between last year's yield and the number of corn or
soybean area yield policies, although the large standard errors make the estimate imprecise.
Surprisingly, Table 3 also shows that current yields are positively correlated with insurance
takeup for both corn and soybeans. This suggests that, on net, selection into GRP plans acts in
favor of insurers: in years when yields will be high (controlling for expected yield) more corn and
soybean farmers will take out county yield insurance.
Appendix B shows the results of an OLS regression of the log of GRP policies on current and
past yields, controlling for expected yield and fixed effects. In general, the results for corn are
insignificant and those for soybeans are marginally significant. However, due to the count nature of
the data, a negative binomial specification is more appropriate.
One issue with equation (3.4) is that it may not adequately control for other changes that may
be correlated with last year's yields. In particular, changes in last year's yields may affect the
desirability of individual yield or individual revenue plans. This does not matter for the validity of
the test of adverse selection into group yield plans. However, in order to understand the behavior
of market participants and whether there is the possibility of adverse selection on a more aggregate
level, it is useful to look at the aggregate relationship between yields and takeup.
To see whether yield fluctuations are related to the aggregate demand for insurance, I regress
total insurance takeup on last year's and current yields, controlling for the expected yield. The
results are shown in Table 4. Columns 1-3 show the results of an OLS regression of log policies on
yields, while Columns 4-6 show the corresponding results using a negative binomial specification.
A 1% increase in last year's yield is associated with a 0.48 - 0.53% decrease in the total number
of insurance policies for corn and a 0.46 - 0.54% decrease for soybeans, while a 1% increase in this
year's yield is associated with a 0.43-0.44% increase in the number of insurance policies for corn and
a 0.48% increase for soybeans. The same pattern holds for past and current yields in the negative
binomial specifications in Columns 3-6, although the coefficients are generally less significant.
One explanation for this result is that something correlated with current yields (e.g., the prices
farmers face) also makes crop insurance more attractive to farmers. Unfortunately, because of the
reduced form nature of the test and lack of individual data, it is difficult to determine the precise
channel through which this type of selection is taking place. Another possibility is that it is actually
insurance providers who have superior information about future yields and are able to exploit that
information to increase the takeup of insurance in years when yields will be high (and thus payouts
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will be low).
In most other markets where there is potential for adverse selection, the unobserved or unpriced
information is assumed to be known by the individual. In the case of county yields, however, it is
plausible that providers have superior information, especially if they observe individual information
for many other farmers in the same county and are thus better informed about the data generating
process. If it is the case that providers are better informed, why don't they change their prices?
First, it may be more profitable for providers to practice selection of farmers into insurance plans
rather than change prices. Second, because crop insurance is reinsured by the government, providers
are not as free to set their prices as they would be in a perfectly competitive market. In particular,
once a price is approved by the Risk Management Agency, providers are prohibited from competing
on prices. Thus, much of the competition may be taking place on the margin of who to sign up for
a particular insurance plan and when.
3.6 Conclusion
Worldwide, the question of how to efficiently provide farmers with adequate protection against
weather shocks remains unanswered. A way to create sustainable unsubsidized markets in crop
insurance is yet to be developed. The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 was a major step taken
by the US government to replace a standing crop disaster assistance program for which farmers did
not pay with (subsidized) crop insurance. Initial hopes of insuring 50% of eligible acreage by 1988
proved overly optimistic; only 25% was insured by this time. Participation rates remained low into
the 1990's, despite increasing subsidization of premiums. Although the current participation rate is
high, it comes at a high subsidy cost: the federal government pays nearly 60% of the premiums, on
average. Because of the large costs of the current insurance program, there have been proposals to
eliminate the crop insurance program and return to a standing disaster assistance program (Glauber,
2007).
Standard explanations for the reluctance of the private sector to enter this market include the
non-idiosyncratic nature of shocks, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Although the US crop
insurance market was designed with the awareness of adverse selection and moral hazard in this
sector, numerous ways in which farmers can exploit the design of the system remain. In this paper, I
test for the presence of adverse selection in group risk insurance plans, where farmers are paid based
on yield shortfalls in the county as a whole, regardless of their own yields. I use last year's yield
(which is predictive of the current yield but does not affect the price of the plan) as information
on which farmers could adversely select in and out of group insurance. I also test whether the
current yield (which is realized after the insurance purchase decision is made) is predictive of group
insurance takeup.
I find no evidence that last year's yields influence takeup of group insurance plans. However,
the reduced-form test indicates that group insurance takeup is higher when average current yields
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are higher. This suggests that the net selection into area yield plans favors providers, not buyers of
insurance. This is consistent with earlier findings that insurance companies may practice weather-
based adverse selection into reinsurance plans (Ker and McGowan, 2000). In this case, the selection
may be working through insurance agents convincing farmers to choose one plan over another or
through targeting particular counties in years when yields are likely to be high. Unfortunately, I
cannot determine the exact mechanism with the current data. However, this is an important avenue
of future research. If providers of area yield or weather-based insurance are able to better predict
outcomes than the individuals they insure and are able to use non-price mechanisms to increase
takeup in years when insurance is least necessary, this undermines the potential of such plans to
provide a cheap and moral hazard free insurance mechanism.
Finally, I find that yields are significant predictors of total insurance demand in OLS regressions
of total insurance takeup on current and past yields. This suggests that the desirability of non-
group insurance plans is changing with yields as well. However, because prices in these plans
are determined using individual yields, which I do not observe, I cannot determine whether the
relationship between aggregate takeup of insurance and yields is due to selection or changes in
prices. One of the shortcomings of this test is the lack of individual data, which would allow a
similar test to be performed with individual yield and revenue plans. Because farmers may have
much better information about their own potential yields than insurers do, adverse selection based
on unpriced information may operate differently in individual plans than in group plans.
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3.8 Appendix A
The baseline for individual revenue insurance is also based on the farmer's 4 - 10 year yield history
but takes prices into account as well. The baseline revenue is the average of the individual's historic
yields multiplied by the Chicago Board of Trade pre-growing season futures prices for that crop.10
The actual revenue is calculated using the 1-month futures price near the harvest time for that crop
(called the "harvest futures price"):
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'
0 The exact month varies by crop.
Pay _RAt = max (0, Revenue guaranteeit - Revenuet)
110
Revenue guaranteet = Xi * P (pre - season)t * 1 Yieldi,t_,
s=1
Revenuet = Yieldit * P (harvest)t
In some plans, farmers have the option to have the revenue guarantee based on the maximum
of the February and the harvest futures prices. This decreases the probability of a claim as well as
the price of the insurance plan.
There are four different types of individual revenue plans: Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC),
Income Protection (IP), Indexed Income Protection (IIP), and Revenue Assurance (RA). The char-
acteristics of all individual revenue plans are very similar. The only difference between CRC and
RA plans is that the former has a limit on the amount of payment that is made in case of a loss.
The IP plan is similar to the CRC and RA plans, but there is no possibility to base the revenue
guarantee on the harvest futures price. In addition, the IP requires that all cropland in a county
that belongs to the same entity and grows a particular crop be insured together. This is called an
"enterprise unit". CRC and RA allow the cropland to be divided into more basic units and insured
separately. Starting in 2011, the four revenue protection plans have been combined into two plans
to eliminate redundancies.
The IIP plan is a variation of the IP plan that is based on individual yield histories relative to
county yields. The baseline yield is established by subtracting the average historic difference between
individual and county yields from the expected county yield, which is defined as the average county
yield in the previous year. In other words, the yield guarantee for year t is:
[____ 110 ____ 110
X Yieldct 1 - Yielde,t-, + 1 1 Yieldi,t_,
S=1 8=1.
where Xi is again the coverage level chosen by the farmer.
The final category of insurance plans is group revenue (Group Risk Income Protection or GRIP)
insurance that pays farmers based on a combination of county yields and futures prices. As with
the individual revenue plans, prices in the county revenue plan are based on CBT futures prices for
the crop. The county revenue plan payments are determined as follows:








Revenuect = Yieldct * P (harvest)t
3.9 Appendix B
In this section, I regress the prices of GRP crop insurance on last year's, current, and expected
yields. The level of observation is county-year-coverage-level. The coverage level ranges from 65%
to 90% in increments of 5 percentage points.
Table Al shows the relationship between the price of GRP policies and last year's yield, con-
trolling for expected yield. There is no statistically significant relationship between prices and last
year's yield. The expected yield is negatively and significantly correlated with the price.
Table A2 shows the relationship between the price of GRP policies and this year's yield, control-
ling for expected yield. Again, there is no statistically significant relationship between the current
yield and the price. Moreover, the high R-squared suggests that the variables included in the
regression capture nearly all the relevant variation in prices.
In Table A3, I show OLS regressions corresponding to Table 3. Although high yields last year
are strongly predictive of lower yields this year, there is no significant relationship between last
year's yields and the number of currently held policies (although the estimate is not very precise).
Current yields are also not significant predictors of the total takeup. For both current and past
yields, the sign of the estimated coefficient is the opposite of what would be predicted by theory.
Changing the dependent variable to Log (Policiesit + 1) to take into account observations where




Figure 1. The relationship between expected and actual yields.
LO-
Corn
0 50 100 150 200
Soybeans
- - - - Quadratic fit line --------- 45 degree line





0 50 100 150 200
Soybeans
0 ne - - f0
Last yea's yield
---- 45 degree line ----- Quadratic fit line]
108
Tables




Number of Group Risk
Plan (GRP) policies
Share of GRP policies






















Note: standard deviations in parentheses.
109
Table 2. The relationship between consecutive years' yields
Log(Yieldlt) Yieldlt














Mean of dep. var. 4.84 4.88 130.78 135.16













Mean of dep. var. 3.59 3.64 37.72 39.35
Observations 9,814 7,533 9,814 7,533
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by state-year) in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Includes year
and county fixed effects.
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Table 3. Past yields and current takeup, negative binomial regression
Corn Soybeans
Log(Yieldl,t-1) 0.386 0.378 0.015 -0.026
(0.293) (0.284) (0.192) (0.180)
Log(Yieldlt) 0.739 0.753 0.438 0.492
(0.268)* (0.266)* (0.221)* (0.216)*
Log(Et-1[Yieldit]) -1.507 -1.814 -2.130 1.364 1.482 1.101
(1.024) (0.906)* (0.955)* (0.556)* (0.527)* (0.560)*
Mean of dep. var. 8.01 7.94 8.01 9.33 8.74 9.33
Observations 6,483 7,209 6,483 7,291 8,179 7,291
Note: Cluster bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Dependent variable is the number of policies in county I at time t. Includes county and year fixed effects.
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Table 4. Past yields and aggregate insurance demand





(0.2266)* (0.2299)* (0.035) (0.037)
Log(Yieldit) 0.4441 0.4312 0.100 0.066
(0.1993)* (0.2090)* (0.046)* (0.050)
Log(Et-1 [Yieldit]) -2.7741 -2.2683 -2.6207 -0.648 -0.301 -0.634
(0.6984)** (0.6923)** (0.6790)** (0.136)*** (0. 153)* (0.131)***
Mean ofdep.var. 2.16 2.12 2.16 384 389 384





(0.1606)* (0.1578)* (0.035) (0.035)
Log(Yieldit) 0.4769 0.4840 0.084 0.062
(0.1387)* (0.1354)* (0.034)* (0.032)*
Log(Et-1[Yieldit]) -2.5129 -1.3108 -2.0636 0.071 0.259 0.111
(0.6161)* (0.6125)* (0.6180)* (0.152) (0.157) (0.158)
Mean ofdep.var. 2.15 2.10 2.15 361 370 361
Observations 5,428 5,839 5,428 9,797 10,726 9,797
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by state-year for OLS, cluster bootstrapped for binomial) in
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Includes county and year
fixed effects.
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(0.0027)* (0.0012)* (0.0038)* (0.0031)*
Mean of dep. var. 0.78 0.66 2.80 2.38 0.45 0.34 2.03 1.74
Observations 37,567 28,925 37,567 28,925 44,947 34,061 44,947 34,061
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by state-year) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Includes county-by-coverage-level and year-by-coverage-level fixed effects.
Soybeans

































var. 0.80 0.66 2.88 2.40 0.46 0.34 2.05 1.75
Observations 40,103 29,337 40,103 29,337 46,251 34,591 46,251 34,591
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by state-year) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;







Table A3. Past yields and current takeup, OLS
Log(Policieslt) Log(Policieslt+1)
Panel A: corn
Log(Yieldl,t-1) -0.0966 -0.0651 -0.0784 -0.0655
(0.1994) (0.1952) (0.1024) (0.1018)
Log(Yieldlt) 0.1975 0.2437 0.0966 0.1070
(0.1694) (0.1695) (0.1027) (0.1123)
Log(Et-1[Yieldit]) -2.4695 -2.1521 -2.3682 -2.0288 -1.7190 -1.9949
(0.5608)* (0.5507)*** (0.5579)* (0.3531)* (0.3129)* (0.3515)***
Mean of dep. var. 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.08 1.05 1.08
Observations 4,550 4,937 4,550 8,272 9,303 8,272
Panel B: soybeans
Log(Yieldl,t-1) -0.2804 -0.2479 -0.2039 -0.1961
(0.1372)* (0.1370)* (0.0882)* (0.0876)*
Log(Yieldit) 0.2424 0.2397 0.0300 0.0746
(0.1280)* (0.1274)* (0.0887) (0.0886)
Log(Et-1 [Yieldit]) -0.7349 0.0302 -0.5101 -0.7992 -0.4891 -0.7459
(0.5501) (0.5472) (0.5565) (0.3253)* (0.3161) (0.3194)*
Mean of dep. var. 1.81 1.77 1.81 1.00 0.98 1.00
Observations 4,785 5,163 4,785 9,814 10,749 9,814
Note: Robust standard errors (clustered by state-year) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; -*
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Includes county and year fixed effects.
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